WONG MAN TAT v. CHAN YUEN MAN AND OTHERS DCCJ2853/2005

S’s words:-
It is rare that we can find case authorities that leave to appeal was granted by District Court.

The following case is one of them of which the Judge agreed that part of his findings came from inference and the Court of Appeal is entitled to draw a different inference.

However, it does not imply that every losing party could suggest the Judge form his conclusion by way of inference; otherwise, the Judge would be a rubber stamp in leave to appeal applications..

I believe this case will be an interesting case in the Court of Appeal in the future. In other daily life, we have received too much enquires in relation to water seepage allegations.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing Down Decision : 27th September 2007

DCCJ 2853/2005 was a claim by the owner of Flat 1802 (“1802”) of Block C, Westlands Gardens, No. 4 Westlands Road, Quarry Bay, Hong Kong (“the Building”) and against the ownersof Flat 1801 (“1801”) of the Building, due to water seepage from the Defendant’s master bathroom into the Plaintiff’s master bathroom.

The Plaintiff applied to this Court for an injunction restraining the Defendants from repeating or continuing the nuisance of water seepage from the shower stall and floor drain of the master bathroom in 1801 to 1802; an order that the Defendants to rectify the same; and damages for: (1) diminution in value of the premises to be assessed; (2) discomfort and inconvenience and disturbance; (3) surveyor fee of HK$20,000.00 and; (4) plumber charges of HK$15,000.00.

The Defendants counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for: (1) discomfort and inconvenience and disturbance to be assessed; (2) surveyor fee of HK$10,000.00; and (3) plumber charges of HK$8,500.00.

After trial, I granted the Plaintiff’s application for injunction, ordered the Defendants to rectify the water seepage, ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff plumber charges of HK$15,000.00 and ordered the Plaintiff’s claim for diminution in value of the premises to be assessed on a day to be fixed. The counterclaim was dismissed with costs of both the claim and counterclaim to the Plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed.’

The Defendants now seek leave to appeal my decision and a stay of execution pending appeal.

The applicable test is set out in Smith v Cosworth Casting Processes Limited [1997] 1 WLR 1538. Lord Woolf, MR stated the relevant principles as follows:

“ i) The court will only refuse leave if satisfied that applicant has no realistic prospect of succeeding on the appeal. The test is not meant to be any different from that which is sometimes used, which is that the applicant has no arguable case. Why however this court has decided to adopt the former phase is because the use of the word “realistic” makes it clear that a fanciful prospect or an unrealistic argument is not sufficient.
ii) The court can grant the application even if it is not satisfied. There can be many reasons for granting leave even if the court is not satisfied that the appeal has any prospect of success. For example, the issue may be one which the court considers should in the public interest be examined by this court or, to be more specific, this court may take the view that the case raises an issue where the law requires clarifying.”

Part of the grounds of appeal deals with my finding of fact that water seeping from the tiles in the 1801 shower area was the source of water seeping into 1802. This finding was made by a process of inference, drawn when I found the 1801 shower area wall-tiles seeped water under the floor tiles, that it was more likely than not the shower area also seeped water under the wall-tiles onto the partition wall. When there was no evidence of any other source of water seepage, the water seepage under the shower area wall-tiles was more likely than not, the source of water seepage in the 1801 side of the partition wall.

The proper approach, when an appeal is against a Court’s finding of primary facts is set out in Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen & Ors [2002] 3 HKLRD at para. 32 to 46. Bokhary PJ’s judgment in Ting Kwok Keung can be summarized as follows :

(1) Appeals against findings of primary facts are approached very differently from appeals against findings of fact made by a process of inference;
(2) Where findings of facts are made by a process of inference, no question of credibility arises;
(3) An appellate court is universally reluctant to reject a finding of specific fact, particularly where the finding could be found on the credibility or bearing of a witness;
(4) On the other hand, an appellate court is customarily willing to form an independent opinion about the proper inference of fact, subject only to the weight which should be given to the opinion of the court below;
(5) Where the judgment turns on an issue of facts, the Court of Appeal must have regard to the nature of that issue of fact and to the advantage enjoyed by a trial judge who received evidence on such issue first-hand;
(6) The question for the Court of Appeal is whether, even though it does not enjoy the advantages enjoyed by the trial judge who received evidence first-hand, it is nevertheless satisfied that the trial judge’s conclusion on the facts is plainly wrong.

My finding of fact was based on a process of inference and the Court of Appeal is entitled to form its own opinion about the proper inference. Leave should therefore be granted.