Showing posts with label Personal Injuries. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Personal Injuries. Show all posts

09 November 2008

NG CHO SHING (the Administrator of the estate of WU HEUNG LIN, the deceased) v. CHAN YUNG CHI &others DCPI1323/2006

S’s words:

In the past, I did have an opportunity to take over a PI case that was previously handled as a mess . At the time when I have got the opportunity to reach this judgment, not even read it completely, I felt very surprised of the progress of the claim and those issues having been commented by the learned PI Judge.

However, as the judgment contains a very lengthy part III Progress of the claim, I have not quoted those paragraphs here but would intend to leave all those interested readers to find the original judgment from the internet or otherwise. The Practice Direction has been mentioned to express the concern of the Honourable Court for the compliance thereof.

It is not impossible that an accident occurred 4 years ago and trial not yet commenced. But when we get a closer look, the action was commenced in 2006. The Writ was not served immediately and even in certain time the Court was asked to give indulgence to the Plaintiff’s solicitors to extend the validity of the Writ to be served.

We may say one of the main reason behind is that two of the defendants were acting in person all the time and the 3rd defendant could not be located until quite a late stage.
For such, the learned PI Judge correctly pointed out that the failure on the part of the Plaintiff’s solicitors to comply with their own undertaking to the Court for Chinese court documents to be made.

The non-compliance would in no doubt give the learned PI Judge the sufficient justification to set aside the default judgment (due to the non-compliance of an Unless Order on the part of the 1st and 2nd Defendants), but more important, the Unless Order Summons failed to strike out the handmade Defence of the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

My view is that, with the comments made by the learned PI Judge, the Plaintiff’s solicitors should not wait until the 1st and 2nd Defendants to make their application to set aside the default judgment by themselves. Certainly, one again may say that the Plaintiff’s solicitors chose to withhold making such application at that moment as there was a legal aid stay of the proceedings and they had in mind to do so after the expiry of legal aid stay. God knows.

But why the Honourable Court was not informed of the Plaintiff’s legal aid application in the previous hearings. That gives the learned PI Judge further opportunity to explain when it would be appropriate to uplift the legal aid stay of a proceedings.

Now, the default judgment against the 1st and 2nd Defendants were set aside. We may require to wait further to see the final outcome of the action.

However, in this case, as I have mentioned earlier before, at least the following areas:-
1. Not to delay the service of the Writ;
2. Service to a defendant of his whereabouts unknown;
3. Renew the validity of a Writ;
4. Strict compliance to the undertakings given to the Court;
5. Unless Order;
6. Setting Aside Regular/Irregular Judgment; and
7. Uplifting legal aid stay

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 3rd November, 2008

The Plaintiff is the son and administrator of Madam Wu Heung Lin (“Deceased”) who died on 18th August 2004. However, this is not a fatal accident but a personal injuries case. At the time of the alleged accident referred to below and shortly thereafter at the time of her death, she was about 86 years old.

All along the Plaintiff was represented by the same firm of solicitors, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants acted in person.

III. Progress of the claim

IV. Plaintiff’s summons to enter final judgment against the 1st 2nd and 3rd Defendants

On 29th September 2008, notwithstanding the Court Undertaking, the Plaintiff issued a summons in the English language (“Final Judgment Summons”) returnable at the same time as the PTR for the following reliefs with margin note “O.32, r.7 and O.42, r.2 of the RDC, Cap.336H and inherent jurisdiction of the District Court” :

(a) “[unless] the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants do serve an Answer to the Plaintiff’s Statement of Damages within 7 days, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants be precluded from filing and serving the said Answer in the proceedings and judgment on liability be entered for the Plaintiff against the 3rd Defendant and the damages to be assessed at HK$455,000 as per the Statement of Damages”; and
(b) “costs of and occasioned by this Summons be paid by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants to the Plaintiff in any event”.

However, notwithstanding the Final Judgment Summons, the Plaintiff’s solicitors filed the PTR Notice on 8th October 2008 confirming the estimated length of trial was 2-3 days and annexing a draft order to the effect that the assessment of damages against the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the trial against the 3rd Defendant be set down to be heard before a bilingual judge.

At the PTR, Mr Raymond Wong, solicitor for the Plaintiff, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants appeared before me. I expressed grave concern over the breach of the Court Undertaking in preparing the Final Judgment Summons (which by its terms sought final judgment against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants whom the Plaintiff’s solicitors well knew were not legally presented and prepared their Defence and other documents in the Chinese language) in the English language. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants informed me they received but did not understand the Final Judgment Summons.

Mr Wong admitted it was due to oversight by the Plaintiff’s solicitors, and I particularly reminded that there must be strict compliance of an undertaking to the court, particularly by a solicitor who is an officer of the court, and application must be made to the court for release from such undertaking on good grounds shown if it cannot be complied with. Breach of an undertaking to the court by its officer is a serious matter, which the court views with consternation and regret, and which may be visited with sanctions where appropriate.

In the end, Mr Wong sought leave to withdraw the Final Judgment Summons, and undertook not to charge the Plaintiff in respect of costs of and occasioned by the Final Judgment Summons. I therefore granted leave to the Plaintiff to withdraw the Final Judgment Summons with costs in favour of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants in any event to be taxed if not agreed.

V. Judgment : regular or irregular?
At the PTR, the 1st and 2nd Defendants informed me they still maintained the defence on liability as pleaded in the Defence. They have not applied to set aside the Judgment as they claimed to have been unaware of the effect of the Judgment, which regrettably was drawn up in the English language in breach of the Court Undertaking.

But quite apart from such consideration, there is a more fundamental problem with the Unless Order and hence the Judgment. The Unless Order provides that unless the 1st and 2nd Defendants file/serve copies of documents and file/exchange witness statements as to fact by a specified deadline, judgment on liability would be entered against them for damages to be assessed. There is no mention in the Unless Order that the Defence filed respectively by the 1st and 2nd Defendants would be struck out before judgment was entered. So when the 1st and 2nd Defendants failed to file and serve/exchange copies of documents and witness statements by the specified deadline, the Plaintiff entered judgment against them but did not strike out their Defence.

However, since the respective Defence of the 1st and 2nd Defendants that raised disputes on both liability and quantum (ie denying the Accident and/or averring that the damages claimed were incorrect, excessive and/or unreasonable) still stands, their very existence ought to preclude judgment on liability from being entered without trial.

I see no difference between judgment on liability entered by default and judgment on liability entered pursuant to an “unless” order. In either case, there is no trial on the merits. Thus, judgment on liability entered pursuant to an “unless” order for default in compliance with interlocutory directions is also necessarily based on implied admission of the plaintiff’s pleaded claim. Such rationale logically requires the defence (which disputes the plaintiff’s claim) to be struck out before entering judgment on liability otherwise such judgment will be irregular and embarrassing. That is why Order 24 rule 16(1) of the RDC provides for striking out the defence and entering judgment on liability and in Kai Yip Air-Condition Engineering Comapny Chung J granted an “unless” order to the effect that unless the defendant complied with his directions the defence be struck out and the counterclaim be dismissed before entering judgment. So long as the Defence filed by the 1st and 2nd Defendants stand (and there is no question that they still stand), the Judgment appears to be irregular.

IX. Lifting legal aid stay
As an initial observation, this was the first application for legal aid by the Plaintiff. According to the relevant Memorandum, such application appears to have been made a few days after the PTR on 15th October 2008. But notwithstanding such application, the Plaintiff is still represented by his solicitors. Further, there was no intimation by the Plaintiff’s solicitors to the court in the CLR Notice of 29th August 2008 or the PTR Notice of 8th October 2008 or by Mr Wong who appeared at the PTR on 15th October 2008 that there was already an application or there would be an intended application for legal aid by the Plaintiff. The silence is loud as the Plaintiff’s solicitors by both notices sought to set the case down for trial/assessment of damages with an estimated length of 2-3 days. No explanation is forthcoming for the lateness or suddenness of the application in light of the above.

Ms Gigi Mak, solicitor for the Plaintiff who appeared at the hearing of the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ summonses before me, accepted that if there were an extant application for legal aid, the Plaintiff’s solicitors should have informed the court about such application at the last CLR on 8th September 2008 or at the PTR on 15th October 2008 (as was appropriate) since it would have impact on the timeline for fixing the date for trial/assessment for damages or other case management directions.

Consequently, the court was surprised by Ms Mak’s submissions that in fact the Plaintiff approached the DLA prior to the PTR on 15th October 2008, but the DLA only issued the Memorandum subsequently on 20th October 2008. However, she was unable to tell the court the date when the Plaintiff approached the DLA or produce the acknowledgment card of the processing unit of the Legal Aid Department confirming receipt of the application for legal aid. Time was given to Ms Mak to take instructions and/or produce the acknowledgment card, but she was unable to bring the matter further except to say the Plaintiff told her by telephone he applied to the DLA by letter and it was on 20th October 2008.

I therefore ordered that the legal aid automatic stay be lifted in relation to the hearing and determination of the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ summonses dated 22nd October 2008.

In the circumstances, I made an order at the hearing that the Unless Order (which is the genesis of the Judgment) and the Judgment be set aside.

05 November 2008

LEUNG WAI KEUNG v. CHOI YEE MAY, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF CHOI KWOK PING, DECEASED trading as CHOICE OPTICAL CENTRE HCPI 917 / 2005

S’s words:-

The Plaintiff failed his claim on the issue of quantum with the issue of liability not in dispute. The employees’ compensation award was about HK$1.5 million. Such a huge amount for ECC compensation so received by a plainitff do make me feel surprising. If we understand about the formula for ECC claims well, it is too difficult to get an ECC award for such a huge amount bearing in mind in particular the plaintiff was very much over 50 years old at the time of the accident. Thus, one should have expected that the ECC award (which I believe the same was settled without a trial) did have at least partially taken into account of the common law claim (which later became the subject matter of this action).

I have no idea how the ECC award was so resolved but one should be careful as to how to proceed with a common law claim incidental to the same accident. If I were given the opportunity to handle such a case, Counsel’s advice to give a more precise estimate of the quantum was highly preferred even at pre-action stage. Certainly, only the handling solicitor/counsel would be in the best position to make comments or better estimate to the quantum of a claim.


Last to say, it is quite unusual for a defendant choosing to defend an action without any offer or payment into Court with the issue of liability being entered. If such settlement proposals was/were given to the plaintiff, the plaintiff might be regarded as having a hopeless case even before the assessment hearing. In any event, the case was just decided, it is not known yet whether the plaintiff would choose to appeal against the decision.


--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Judgment : 31 October 2008

1. By the Writ of Summons filed on 30 September 2005, the Plaintiff claimed against the Defendant for damages for personal injury, loss and damages sustained in the course of employment arising out of negligence and breach of contract of employment and statutory duty of the Defendant, its servant or agents at Shop G33, Ground Floor, Empire Centre Shopping Arcade, Tsimshatsui East, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“the Shop”) on 19 May 2003.

2. Interlocutory judgment on liability was obtained on 10 May 2006 with damages to be assessed.

3. The Plaintiff was born on 30 September 1949. He was almost 54 at the time of the accident. He is 59 at the time of this assessment.

87. Credit must be given to the sum of $1.5 million received by the Plaintiff in the Employees Compensation Claim. The award is less than the compensation received by the Plaintiff under the Employee Compensation Claim.

(i) Costs for the hearing on 6 March 2008
89. This assessment was first listed before me on 6 March 2008. The Plaintiff, then represented by Mr. T. Wong of Counsel instructed by Messrs. Yip, Tse and Tang, made an application for adjournment on the ground that the Plaintiff had a hoarse voice and was unable to give audible evidence. Mr. Sakhrani opposed the application on the ground that the Plaintiff’s complaint was not a genuine one. There was no medical evidence before me to support or contradict the Plaintiff’s complaint. I granted the application and with costs reserved. I also observed that it was very likely that I would order costs against the Plaintiff. Yet, should the Plaintiff be in the position to produce medical evidence to support his complaint was a genuine one, the position would be different.

90. Up till now, there is no evidence to support the complaint of the Plaintiff on 6 March 2008. The Plaintiff sought the adjournment and should bear the costs. Although there is no need for me to make any order in the light of the costs order made hereinbelow, ...

13 December 2007

TSE PARC KI a minor by her father and next friend, TSE WAH YUEN JOSEPH v. ATLANTIC TEAM LTD t/a LE BEAUMONT LANGUAGE CENTRE DCPI001981/2006

S’s words:-
The Minor was injured when she was having a Spanish program. The liability on the part of the school is obvious. Without legal representatives’ assistance, the Defendant chose to defend the issue of liability that caused a referral to the police for an investigation of employing an unemployable.

I believe the Defendant is/was not insured (or properly insured) at the material time, or otherwise, the insurer would take over the conduct of the proceedings and the tragdey abovementioned would not occur.

For the issue of quantum, the amount of PSLA awarded in the sum of HK$40,000.00 is another good amount that in future we can adopt to rely on for minor injuries. Certainly, it is expected the father of the Minor (as a father) would not regard the injuries as minor.

Who is the father of the Minor? That is another matter I believe the Honourable Court has not taken into account.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing down Judgment : 11th December 2007

Parc-ki was 2 and 1/2 years old when she was enrolled in a 12-lesson Spanish program offered by the Defendant at its language centre in Admiralty.

How did the accident happen?
Parc-ki’s parents were not present when the accident happened. According to Parc-ki’s mother, she was told what had happened when she returned to the Defendant’s language centre after the accident. Tony and Emily (who were both staff at the Defendant’s language centre) told her that Parc-ki had wanted to use the toilet during the lesson and left the classroom. As Parc-ki was trying to put on her shoes at the doorway, Sonia slammed the classroom door. Parc-ki’s right middle finger was caught by the door and was crushed.

The Defendant put forward a very different version of events in its Amended Defence. The Defendant says that the Spanish program had already finished when the accident happened. Parc-ki had left the classroom and was no longer under the care of Sonia. As Parc-ki’s parents were late to receive Parc-ki, she had to put on the shoes herself. When she lifted up one leg to put on her shoe, she lost balance and stretched her hands backward towards the doorway. Shortly before that, Sonia had just given a gentle push to close the classroom door. Parc-ki’s right middle finger was therefore caught by the closing door and was crushed.

Two different versions of events have been put forward by the parties. I find the Defendant’s version unreliable for the above reasons. On the other hand, the Plaintiff’s version is not based on direct evidence but on hearsay evidence. Be that as it may, there is nothing for me to cast doubt on the testimony of Parc-ki’s mother as to what she was told. It is only reasonable for the Defendant’s staff to report to her when she attended the Defendant’s language centre after the accident. Tony and Emily were clearly on duty at the time. Indeed, Tony admits having spoken to Parc-ki’s mother after the accident although he now claims to have forgotten what was said to her. The Defendant has also put much emphasis on the impossibility of Sonia “slamming” the door. In my view, it matters not whether the door was slammed shut or closed gently. This is a figure of speech and a matter of perception. There is really no dispute that Parc-ki’s finger was indeed caught by the door that was closed by Sonia. What matters is whether Sonia had done what was required of her as Parc-ki’s teacher in the circumstances of this case to ensure the safety of Parc-ki. This will be discussed further below.

In the premises, I find the Plaintiff’s version of what happened more believable.

Whether the Defendant is liable for the personal injuries suffered by Parc-ki?
There is a positive duty on schoolteachers to protect their students’ well-being. The duty of a schoolteacher has been said to be to take such care of his pupils as a reasonably careful father would take of the children of the family. It is a schoolteacher’s duty to take all reasonable and proper steps, bearing in mind the known propensities of children, to prevent any of his pupils from suffering injury, whether from inanimate objects, from the actions of their fellow pupils, or from a combination of both. What things are likely to injure pupils is a question of degree, depending on the nature of the thing and the age of the pupils. A schoolteacher is also under a duty to exercise supervision over pupils whilst they are on the school premises. The amount of supervision required depends on the age of the pupils and what they are doing at the material time, but no teacher could reasonably be expected to keep a close watch on each child every minute of the day, unless there is some reason to be alerted or put on inquiry. Given the level of responsibility, the standard of care is high, although not expressed as any more than should be reasonably expected in the circumstances. See Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, 11th edition (2006), §§8-179 to 8-193.

The Defendant operated the language centre and Sonia was assigned by the Defendant to run that program. In my view, the positive duty put on schoolteachers to protect their students’ well-being applies equally to Sonia. On the day in question, Sonia closed the door knowing full well that Parc-ki was still trying to put on her shoes at the doorway. Sonia was negligent in failing to ensure that Parc-ki had put on her shoes or was otherwise well clear of the doorway before closing the door. Whether the door was slammed shut or closed gently is beside the point. The Defendant as the provider of the Spanish program relied on Sonia to run the program in order to earn the course fees. In my view, the tortious act of Sonia was so closely connected with her employment with the Defendant that it would be fair and just to hold the Defendant vicariously liable.

In the premises, I find the Defendant liable for the personal injuries suffered by Parc-ki.

What is the amount of compensation payable to Plaintiff?
After the accident, Parc-ki was taken to the Accident and Emergency Department of Queen Mary Hospital. Physical examination by Dr. Lo Wing-kee showed avulsed nail and bleeding from the nail bed in the right middle finger. X-ray showed a chip fracture in the distal phalanx.

According to Parc-ki’s mother, it took 8 months for Parc-ki to get over from being conscious of the injury. Thankfully, there is nothing to suggest that Parc-ki has suffered any permanent disability.

The Plaintiff’s counsel fairly concedes the claim for “future loss of earnings / loss of opportunity” and the claim for “loss of earning capacity / handicap in the labour market”. In any event, I do not think such an award is justified given the fact that Parc-ki has not suffered any disability that would affect her future earning capacity.

As to the claim for damages for PSLA, the Plaintiff’s counsel (who did not settle the Revised Statement of Damages) relies on Singh Jagdeep v. VSC Engineering Products Company Limited, DCPI 391/2005 and Yu Pau Yau v. Co-Ray Design & Construction Limited, DCPI 864/2006 and now suggests a figure of $50,000 to $100,000.

In Jagdeep, the plaintiff’s left hand was hit by a broken disc from an electric disc cutter machine. He suffered abrasion over the left dorsal part of his hand. Fingers’ movement and sensation were otherwise normal and there was no fracture. Sick leave was granted for a total of 16 days. The learned judge found that the plaintiff had suffered a ½ cm abrasion with minimal pain and suffering and awarded $30,000 for PSLA in June 2005. I find Parc-ki’s injury slightly more serious than that suffered by the plaintiff in Jagdeep.

Taking everything into consideration, I consider that an award of $40,000 for PSLA is justified.

As the facts of this case reveal that the Defendant might have committed a criminal offence in employing Sonia who was not legally employable in Hong Kong at the time, the case is referred to the Department of Justice through the Registrar for investigation.

14 November 2007

Li Ching v. Guard Able Limited DCPI 2416/2006

S’s words:-

No legal issues I would like to say but my feeling after I read the judgment.

With so many versions of the Plaintiff how she was injured, it was too difficult to convince the Court to accept her story.

I did have the opportunity to handle a case that faced with difficulties in the plaintiff’s story. That case was settled shortly before the trial for a minimal compensation.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of handing down Judgment : 12th November, 2007

This is the Plaintiff’s claim for damages for personal injury, loss and damages sustained by her in the course of her employment arising out of the negligence and breach of common duty of care of the Defendant under the Occupiers’ Liability Ordinance.

In evidence-in-chief she said that she took a look and found that it was Tang Siu Kwong who touched her. She was frightened. She stood up quickly. Her leg was numb because she had sat there and it was cramped there. When she got up there was something in front of her. She turned 90˚. When she was turning she sprained her left ankle. She lost her balance.

Under cross-examination she said that when her superior asked her to patrol she was not running. She was walking. When she was turning her body she paid attention. She said that she did not walk hurriedly.

The Plaintiff’s Counsel submits that “As a result of the hurried return to work, she fell on weak legs and injured herself ….” But it was not pleaded in the Statement of Claim or in her witness statement that she “fell on weak legs and injured herself.” She only mentioned this matter in Court.

Dr. Cheung Tak Fai in his medical report (dated 26.3.2004) states that the Plaintiff attended his clinic on 28.3.2003, and “She gave the history of an injury during work on the captioned date. While she went out from the rest room, she tripped over the door-step and fell. She sprained her left ankle and hit her left side of body against door-case, sprained her neck and low back as well. She experienced severe left ankle and back pain and left upper limb numbness that she could barely walk a few steps.”

The medical report (dated 20.2.2004) of Dr. Y.F. Yeung of the Department of Surgery of the Prince of Wales Hospital states: “Madam Li fell down on duty after tripping over the door frame in 3/2001 and suffered from left shoulder pain radiating down to the fingers afterwards.”

The report of Dr. Li Shun Cheong of the Tai Po Jockey Club Clinic (dated 7/1/2004) states: “She claimed to experience a dizzy spell during work on 22/3/2002. This resulted in a fall and sprained her left ankle.” The medical report of Dr. Chan Ho Yan of the Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital (dated 14.3.2003) says that the Plaintiff sprained her left ankle while she was on duty with preceding syncope on 22/3/02.

In the Notification of Accident at Work submitted to the Labour Department on 29th April 2002, she stated “As I was wearing the shoes provided by the company and those were not in the suitable size, I fell and sustained sprain injury.”

The Plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts of the accident to medical doctors, to the Labour Department and to this Court. I am not satisfied that she was telling this Court what had actually happened on the date of the accident. In any event her evidence does not show the cause leading to the spraining of her ankle. She has failed to show how the spraining of her ankle had anything to do with the Defendant. The onus is on the Plaintiff to show that there was negligence on the part of the Defendant, or that the Defendant was in breach of the Occupiers’ Liability Ordinance. She has failed to do so. I therefore dismiss her claims against the Defendant.

01 November 2007

WONG KIN FAN v. FOK YUE MING DCPI 1207/2006

S’s words:-

The parties agreed the quantum leaving the issue of liability and contributory negligence to be decided by the Court.

Drivers are still having a rather high requirement to take reasonable care.

In this case, even though the Plaintiff was the one that was substantially to be blamed, the Defendant being the driver was still liable for 1/3.

If there was any calderbank offer for the issue of contributory negligence, it is highly possible that the Plaintiff could get almost nothing from the action.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of handing down judgment: 23 October 2007

The Plaintiff was to blame for the accident. But was the Defendant negligent too?

Ms Lau for the Plaintiff submitted that even if the Defendant’s case is accepted, the Defendant was still negligent. She relied on numerous cases in which the drivers were found liable for having failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the pedestrians upon seeing them. Mr Wong for the Defendant submitted that the scenarios in these cases are distinguishable from the present case.

In Williams v Needham [1972] RTR 387, the pedestrian was standing by a car and clearly intending to cross the road. In Foskett (an infant) v Mistry [1984] RTR 1, the 16 and ½ year-old boy was cycling downhill and the defendant driver should have seen him from a distance. In Kong Chung Ching & Anor v Lam King Ho & Anor [1992] 1 HKC 104, the pedestrian was outside the railing and looking straight ahead as if he was about to cross the road. In Wong Shek Keung & Anor v Leung Sing Kiu & Anor [1989] 1 HKC 202, the defendant was driving at excessive speed without proper lookout.

The facts in these previous decisions are bound to vary from one to another. However the key question discerned from these decisions should be whether the driver was or ought to be aware of a real possibility that the pedestrian might cross the road though the pedestrian was apparently not looking in the direction of the approaching vehicle. How real such possibility has to be for the driver to take precaution was best explained by the Court of Appeal in Kong Chung Ching (at 107D referring to Ng Ching Hung v Lau Shun Hing, unreported, CA 182/90):

“……There, the court also referred to Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 146 LT 391. The court said:

The root of this liability is negligence, and what is negligence depends on the facts with which you have to deal. If the possibility of the danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then to take no precautions is negligence; but if the possibility of danger emerging is a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man, then there is no negligence in not having taken extraordinary precautions.

The trial judge found that while there was clearly substantial contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, the first appellant was also to blame for the accident……”

Was the possibility of the Plaintiff suddenly stepping onto the Road reasonably apparent or a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man?

The present case contains its peculiar facts. Unlike the cases referred to above, the spot where the Plaintiff stepped onto the Road was an open pavement without railings or parked vehicles. Pedestrians could step onto the Road at any time. This should not be surprising if they did. As can be seen from the photographs, the kerb of that part of the Pavement had in fact been modified into a concrete slope descending onto the Road, and so had been the corresponding kerb of the pavement on the other side the Road. Pedestrians were therefore reasonably expected to make use of this part of the Pavement (and the corresponding part of the opposite pavement) for crossing the Road. A driver approaching there should be able to see that.

In the circumstances, that the Plaintiff might all of a sudden step onto the Road from that part of the Pavement was not a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man. The possibility in fact occurred to the Defendant’s mind. The whole point of his deciding to drive the Taxi further to the right was to avoid accident in case such possibility materialised. The Defendant had to agree with this in court.

In the circumstances, the Defendant was negligent in causing the accident.

I have no reservation that the Plaintiff was substantially to blame for causing the accident. In Williams, the plaintiff was 2/3 responsible. In Kong Chung Ching, the plaintiff was 50% responsible. In Foskett, the plaintiff was 75% responsible.

The quantum has been agreed at HK$120,000 inclusive of interest and net of the employees’ compensation received by the Plaintiff. Discounted by the contributory negligence, the amount would become HK$40,000.

28 October 2007

JERRY CHEN v. WHIRLPOOL (HONG KONG) LIMITED FACV 23/2006

S’s words:-

The Final Court of Appeal was asked to decide an appeal of the Applicant that in my personal view was without merit at all. The Applicant was surprisingly supported with legal aid in this appeal to Court of Final Appeal. Why I make such a comment? Let us look at the decision of Court of Appeal refusing leave be given to the Appellant for leave to appeal:-

“1) We are not satisfied that this case involves matters of great general or public importance. First our decision is based on the unique facts of the case. The relevant legal principles are well established. Second while we accept many Hong Kong employers are asking their employees to work in the Mainland, we are not satisfied that the specific arrangement in this case is also a widespread practice which called for a determination by the Court of Final Appeal.

2) We are also not satisfied that this case comes within the ‘or otherwise limb’. It has not been shown that the situation is exceptional.”

I feel doubt whether we do require any law that extends the duty of an employer to such.

Why legal aid was granted? Would it be the situation that the Applicant had used all/most of the compensation he did receive in his Employees’ Compensation Claim in the litigations in High Court and Court of Appeal?

Anyway, the public fund is now required to pay for the costs of the Respondent. What a pity!

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Judgment : 26 October 2007

The appellant was seriously injured in a traffic accident in Beijing on 13 October 1998. It happened when the car in which he was travelling as a passenger was negligently driven onto its incorrect side of the road and collided with an oncoming motor vehicle. He was in the employ of the respondent, designated as commercial director. The respondent is a Hong Kong company in the Whirlpool group. This group is centred in the United States, but is also present and active in many other parts of the world. As the appellant’s contract of employment with the respondent expressly provided, he was “based in Shanghai … with responsibilities to” a Mainland company headquartered in Shanghai. This company is named Whirlpool Narcissus (Shanghai) Co. Ltd (“WNS”). It served as the corporate vehicle for a joint venture in the Mainland between the Whirlpool group and a Mainland company named Shanghai Narcissus Electric Appliances Co. Ltd.

Employers’ duty of care/contractual liability

Whatever else employers’ common law duty of care and contractual liability despite delegation of performance involves in a case like the present, the appellant cannot succeed under either of these two bases of liability or both of them combined unless he can persuade us to reverse the concurrent findings of the courts below that Mr Zheng was a reasonably competent driver. After giving the matter anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion that there are no circumstances that would justify us in the exceptional course of disturbing those concurrent findings. It is true that there is no evidence as to when Mr Zheng joined WNS, how long he had driven executives on his behalf or how often he did so. But the main thrust of the appellant’s case in the courts below in regard to the sort of driver required was that a professional one was required. That was the focus below, most significantly at the trial. Otherwise there might have been more evidence about Mr Zheng’s activities as a driver.

Vicarious liability

The two problems which the appellant faces on the foregoing argument as to vicarious liability are these. First of all, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the state of the evidence relevant to the point would have been materially more favourable to the other side if the point had been taken at the trial. Secondly, entertaining that point would certainly involve entertaining a point which was not taken in the courts below but which, if accepted, would constitute a major development in the law.

For those reasons, I do not think that the appellant can in the circumstances succeed on vicarious liability. I say nothing on how the law of vicarious liability may develop in future.

The appellant has recovered employees’ compensation. Hopefully he will find some solace in that. I can find no basis on which to enable him to recover more. In the result, I would dismiss the appeal with costs and make an order for legal aid taxation of the appellant’s own costs. It is common ground that costs should be dealt with that way if, as it has turned out, the appeal is dismissed.

LEUNG TSANG HUNG AND LEE WAI YU v. THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KWOK WING HOUSE FACV 4/2007

S’s words:-

Kwok Wing House is a building in Mongkok with a famous bookshop in its Ground Floor. There was a loss of life in the accident. Not only the owner/occupier and tenant of the illegal structure, the Incorporated Owners of the Building was held liable. Once the Incorporated Owners was liable, it thus meant that every owner of the Building was liable. The Policy Consideration was rejected by the Final Court of Appeal. That should be the end of the appeal and the Incorporated Owners should have no way to avoid being responsible to pay for damages.

Personally, I partly agree with the view of Stock JA in Court of Appeal. It would be too harsh for the Incorporated Owners to be liable for the accident. The decision of the Final Court of Appeal was too harsh to the owners, but when we spend just a few minutes to consider the principle mentioned by Mr. Justice Bokhary, the decision was correct.

There is not yet any strict requirement for a building to have third party insurance to cover such kind of accident. We will have such statutory requirement soon. However, in the past, it was really difficult for a building to obtain any such insurance coverage. Now, every building whether old or not should obtain its own insurance.

But, if there was not yet any Incorporated Owners for the Building, it would be difficult for the Plaintiff to sue all owners. There are still lots of buildings in Hong Kong that are without any incorporated owners. The decision of the Final Court of Appeal may again discourage old buildings to have their Incorporated Owners.

That was definitely not in line with the existing policy of the Government to encourage owners to have their own incorporated owners.

---

Date of Judgment: 26 October 2007

Mr Justice Bokhary PJ:

Without attempting an exhaustive statement of the legal position, I think that at least this much can be said. Where any part of, or anything annexed to, the common parts of a building falls off as a result of its hazardous state and causes death, injury or damage in the street below, the incorporated owners are liable in nuisance for the consequences if they knew or ought to have known of the hazard in time to remove it but had unreasonably failed to do so. I regard such a rule as consistent with principle. And, as Lord Reid famously said in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004 at pp 1026H - 1027A, “when a new point emerges, one should ask not whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to it”. That was said in regard to negligence. It holds good in regard to nuisance. On the basis of what these incorporated owners ought to have known in the circumstances of the present case as disclosed by the evidence, I am of the view that the estate of this deceased woman is entitled to succeed against them. For the foregoing reasons and those more fully stated in Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ’s judgment with which I agree, I would allow this appeal in the terms which he proposes.

Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ:

On 10 August 1999 at about 3.00 pm, Madam Liu Ngan Fong Sukey was plying her trade as a hawker at a fixed pitch in Tung Choi Street when she was struck by a piece of concrete which had fallen from the adjacent building. She died in consequence.

The building is known as Kwok Wing House (“the building”) and the object which had caused Madam Liu’s death was a triangular-shaped piece of concrete weighing some 15 lbs which had fallen from the 11th floor. It had formed the corner of a concrete canopy projecting out from over the enclosed balcony of Flat A on that floor (“the flat”), before it had become detached and fallen down into the street.

The plaintiffs are the administrators of the estate of Madam Liu. They sued Tse Yiu Pui and Ho Lai Bing who jointly owned the flat (“the owners”) as the 1st defendants. Chan Kwok Chi was their tenant (“the tenant”) and he was made the 2nd defendant. The 3rd defendants are the incorporated owners of the building, being a corporation which had come into existence on 12 April 1999 upon the owners being registered under the Building Management Ordinance[4] (“the BMO”).

The owners consented to judgment so that at the trial, the Judge was concerned only with the liability of the tenant and the corporation. They were each sued in negligence and public nuisance. His Lordship found the tenant liable along with the owners but dismissed the action against the incorporated owners with costs, holding that they did not owe any actionable duty to the deceased. Damages were assessed in the sum of $1,554,742.00 and judgment in that amount, together with various sums of interest and costs, was entered against the owners and the tenant. The plaintiffs’ appeal to the Court of Appeal in relation to the liability of the incorporated owners was dismissed,[5] again on the basis that the corporation owed the deceased no operative duty. An appeal on quantum is pending in the Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal to this Court was granted by the Court of Appeal[6] under section 22(1)(b) of the Court’s statute.

D.4 Control over the common parts

Given such attributes, can it be said that the incorporated owners in the present case exercised sufficient control over the building’s common parts to justify placing them in a category of actionability in respect of omissions?

In my view, the answer is affirmative. The Ordinance places the incorporated owners under a duty to “maintain the common parts and the property of the corporation in a state of good and serviceable repair ...; and to do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the obligations contained in the deed of mutual covenant ... for the control, management and administration of the building.”[100] The common parts include the external walls.[101] Obligations deemed by the BMO to form part of the DMC which the corporation is duty-bound to enforce include a prohibition against any person converting any common part to his own use without the approval of the owners’ committee.[102]

The DMC in the present case requires each owner to share in the cost of keeping the external parts of the building in good and tenantable repair and condition.[103] It also provides that the parties should not “make any structural alteration to the said building”.[104] Each owner covenants “not to place anything in or to occupy ... any part of the ... said building intended for common use.”[105] The parties also covenant to employ an agent to “generally take care of the said building for the common benefit of the parties hereto and to repair ... the structure and exterior of the said building or any part or parts thereof which are used by the parties hereto in common ...”[106]

To give these powers and duties teeth, the BMO authorizes entry on behalf of the incorporated owners into any flat for the purpose of inspecting, repairing, maintaining or renewing any common parts or other property in the flat causing concern; or for the purpose of “abating any hazard or nuisance which does or may adversely affect the common parts or other owners”.[107] If entry is refused, the BMO empowers a magistrate to issue a warrant authorizing a person to break into the flat in the presence of a police officer.[108] Members of the management committee exercising such powers in good faith and in a reasonable manner are given personal immunity.[109] Costs incurred in the exercise of these powers are recoverable from the owner in question,[110] as are the costs of remedial works which the corporation may undertake itself where the owner fails to do what is necessary, such costs being a charge upon the defaulting party’s share of the property.[111]

D.5 Incorporated owners’ actionable omissions

In the light of the foregoing, it is my view that the legal attributes, duties and powers of the incorporated owners place them in a category closely analogous with that occupied by the owners and occupiers discussed above.[112] They exercise a sufficient degree of control over the common parts of the building to justify making them subject to a duty which is actionable on the basis of omission in respect of nuisance hazards arising on or emanating from those common parts, subject to proof of the other necessary elements of liability.

D.8 Conclusion as to liability

It follows, in my view, that all the elements of liability on the incorporated owners’ part have properly been made out. They are accordingly liable for damages for public nuisance along with the flat’s owners and tenant.

F. Policy considerations

In reaching his decision, Stock JA referred to policy considerations which led him to the view that fixing incorporated owners with liability in a case like the present might have “harsh and unreasonable pragmatic consequences”.

This passage suggests that Stock JA was proceeding on the basis that liability is strict, so that the incorporated owners would be liable even where there is no reasonable basis for considering the structure a hazard. However, if, as has been held above, it is recognized that the law has evolved to the point where liability is premised on the defendant knowing or properly being taken to know of the existence of the hazard, this policy objection falls away. There is nothing harsh or unreasonable about making the body responsible, on behalf of the owners collectively, for keeping the common parts in good repair liable for failing to do so where they know or ought to know of the existence of a nuisance hazard endangering members of the public. The powers of enforcement given to the corporation by the BMO have been mentioned above.[143] The available measures are not confined to action in the courts.

There are moreover, in my view, sound reasons for making the incorporated owners, and not merely the individual owners implicated, responsible. Where the hazard involves the external common parts of a high-rise building, effective inspection and maintenance works can really only be carried out if those parts (and any illegal accretions thereto) are dealt with as a whole, with the erection of scaffolding and the like and with all the owners’ contributing to the cost, subject to possible adjustment regarding the individual owners implicated. And where the nuisance hazard consists of some unauthorized structure encroaching upon or being attached to the common parts, the individual owners who may have erected or adopted the structure and benefit from its existence, may well be unwilling to take any steps to remove it. Compulsion from, or direct action by, the incorporated owners may well be required if the hazard is to be nullified.

02 October 2007

CHAU MING LUNG v. FASTCUT SERVICES LTD AND OTHERS HCPI545/2001

S’s words:-

What had happened ...
The plaintiff was 48 years when he was injured and now he is 57 years old.
The plaintiff spent 3 years for commencing legal proceedings and spent another 6 years to obtain his judgment.

Further, a simple calculation ... 48 + 9 + 6 = ??

Again, with due respect, ... nothing to say further ...

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing Down Judgment : 17 September 2007

On 3 July 1998, the plaintiff Mr Chau was injured whilst working on a platform and fell from a height of about 3 metres. The platform on which he was standing collapsed and he fell to the ground. He was then 48 years of age.

Here Mr Chau has a continuing pain in his hip and both knees. He is now 57 years of age.

(a) Pre-trial loss of earnings
$15,383 x 12 x 9 years 2 months (9.17 years) $1,692,745.00
Less : Wages received - $409,986.00
$1,282,759.00

CHAN KAM PUI v. WONG SIU HUNG AND ANOTHER DCPI1920/2006

S’s words:-
With due respect, ... nothing to say ...

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing down Judgment : 28 September 2007

In these circumstances, I find the Plaintiff was 30% contributory negligent.

In view of the 30% contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, there will be a Costs Order nisi that D1 pays 2/3 of the costs of the action to the Plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for Counsel. Such Costs Order nisi is to be made absolute 14 days after the handing down of the Judgment.

16 September 2007

LEUNG PO CHUN v. YAT LEE BOOTH - CONSTRUCTION CO., LIMITED & HANISON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED HCPI 1099/2006

S’s words:-
The Plaintiff himself had decided to take a dangerous way to handle the works assigned to him. However, the Defendants being failed to provide a safe system of works, both parties were negligent and the Plaintiff could only get 50% of the amount awarded due to his 50% contributorily negligent to the accident.

A few things I would like to point out here:-
1. The Judge took the view that erecting scaffolds requires more skills than dismantling.
2. Scaffolding is physically demanding and dangerous work. Much of the scaffolding work is done at great height. With a less than perfect knee, it is demanding too much of the Plaintiff to say that he could return to his pre-accident employment. That explains why the Judge was also convinced that even there was some exaggerating factors involved in this case, scaffolding would no longer be the occupation of the Plaintiff.
3. The Plaintiff’s case for pre-accident earnings was not at all well documented. However, it is accepted that the Plaintiff could have worked for other companies when the 1st defendant did not have work for him. Thus, the Court accepted that the daily pay for a scaffolder like him is $1,000 and finally concluded that the Plaintiff’s average pre-accident earnings was at $16,000 a month.
4. The Defendant’s Counsel adopted a multiplier of 6.5 years and accepted by the Court due to the fact that the Plaintiff is now 47 and would have retired as a scaffolder at 56. Thus, in future, we have to pay attention to the retiring age of scaffolders to be accepted by the Court.
5. Unfortunately, I have no idea why District scale costs was allowed in this case. Did the Court have considered the usual case authority? As I am not the legal representatives of the parties, I do not want to guess the reasons behind.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Judgment (Handed Down) : 14 September 2007

This is a claim for damages for personal injury by the Plaintiff who is aged 47. He is a very experienced dismantler of bamboo scaffolding. On 7 May 2003, he was in the employment of the 1st Defendant which is a scaffolding contractor providing services for the erection and dismantling of scaffolding at building sites. On this occasion, the 1st Defendant was the scaffolding contractor at a building site at Tai Wo Hau, Kwai Chung (“the Site”) where Phase 7 of the redevelopment of the Kwai Chung Estate was taking place.

The 2nd Defendant was the principal contractor at the Site and as such responsible for the material and personnel hoists which were in use at the Site which comprised tower blocks of residential flats.

Liability
In this case, I am concerned with the catch fence in the shape of a fan which had been built at first floor level at the base of the material hoist which, as its name suggests, was there to carry building material up and down the tower block as it was being built. The hoist comprised a platform on which the material would be placed and transported to the required level of the tower block. No person was allowed to enter this hoist. It was restricted solely for the movement of materials. There was a separate hoist, with which I am not concerned, for the movement of workmen.

The Plaintiff and his colleague were told by their foreman to go to the building site in order to dismantle the catch fences at the foot of the material hoists at Blocks 4 and 5.

It is convenient to observe at this stage that the occupation of a bamboo scaffolder is a specialised one and also a dangerous one requiring scaffolders to work at great height exposed to the elements on the outside of buildings. In a moment, I will need to make reference to the detailed statutory regulations that govern the training of scaffolders and the methods that need to be employed both in the erection and the dismantling of scaffolds. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that scaffolders specialise in either erection or dismantling. Erectors are considered the more skilled because this requires more expertise than dismantling.

Although the Plaintiff has no formal training as a scaffolder, in the sense of having undergone an industrial training course, he is someone of very great experience. He has been a scaffolder for over 20 years learning from his Master as he went along. His has been on the job training, watching and doing what his Master told him. Mr Lee who was with him is also experienced, although less so. He has been doing this work for about 7 years.

In fact what happened, according to the Plaintiff and Mr Lee, is that on finding the fan to be drooping they could not safely get onto it and cut the ties working inwards from the outside. The Plaintiff decided that in such circumstances his best option was for him to get into the material hoist and from there to cut the inner-most ties that bound the fan to the structure of the hoist itself. The Plaintiff says that he assumed that the material hoist was not in use. Nobody was about and the hoist operator was nowhere to be seen.

It seems to me that these considerations are entirely applicable to the facts of this case and they apply to both Defendants. The fact is that no system of work had been laid out for these two men, let alone anything that approached a safe one. Given his vast experience the Plaintiff had, it seems to me, developed this system whereby he would get into the hoist frame and, relatively speaking, quickly snip the fan off in one piece from the hoist frame. The dismantling would then be done on the ground. It was quick. Unfortunately, it also produced a set of circumstances that resulted in an accident waiting to happen which is what occurred on this occasion. Had the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant, as the principal contractor, seen to it that the Code of Practice was adhered to this would not have happened. A method would have been devised to dismantle the fan by cutting the ties from outside the hoist by use of a working platform, as was eventually done after the accident, in combination perhaps with a knife attached to a bamboo pole to reach up where necessary. The process would undoubtedly have been a longer one but it would have been a safe one. I find both Defendants liable in the ways pleaded against them in the Statement of Claim. This being the case, I now need to decide whether the Plaintiff ought to suffer a reduction in his damages by virtue of any negligence on his part in going into the hoist frame.

The factual basis for this relates to the Plaintiff having entered the hoist frame without jamming the door open and having put up a warning sign to the effect that work was in progress in the hoist frame. The Plaintiff and Mr Lee say that they had cordoned off the area with a couple of pedestrian barriers but in my judgment that was wholly insufficient. It strikes me that in approaching the issue “by way of an overall appreciation of [the Plaintiff’s] blameworthiness, taken with the causative potency of whatever he did” that he must bear half the blame for what happened to him. There must therefore be a 50% discount for contributory negligence. It really was asking for trouble to do what he did notwithstanding the Defendants’ failure to provide any safe system of work. I am afraid that the Plaintiff must have realised the risk that he was running and despite it all decided to take it simply because this was the quick way of doing things.

Quantum
Even on the evidence of the film, I do not believe that the Plaintiff could safely return to scaffolding. This is physically demanding and dangerous work. The job that he was doing when he was injured was dismantling at its most basic and as close as one could get to ground level. Much of this work is done at great height. With a less than perfect knee, it is demanding too much of the Plaintiff to say that he could return to his pre-accident employment. I appreciate that he was seen entering a building site on an isolated occasion and although his explanation of collecting back wages that pre-dated the accident is very suspicious, I am unable to say that he can work on building sites on what is a paucity of evidence. Had he been followed for more days and seen entering building sites repeatedly then that might have suggested a different conclusion.

I have been shown a Government generated list of jobs and pay. I would have thought that these days the Plaintiff, who can more probably than not, read to a basic level could work as a waiter, delivery man or general worker and on the statistical evidence command a salary of, doing my best, $7,500 a month which will be the basis of my assessment.

Loss of Earnings
I must first determine his pre-accident earnings. He says it was $22,000 a month although originally claimed at $17,000. The average from the 1st Defendant for the previous 12 months was $10,363. The Plaintiff’s case is not at all well documented but it would be doing him an injustice to restrict him to the documentary evidence. I accept that he worked for other companies when the 1st defendant did not have work for him. The daily pay for a scaffolder like him is $1,000. This I accept. I am afraid I must do my best on sparse evidence. I accept that some employers will keep better records than others. I propose, doing my best, to assess his average pre-accident earnings at $16,000 a month and this figure will also form the basis of my assessment.

Future Loss of Earnings
The multiplicand will be $8,500. Mr Lim’s multiplier of 6.5 years is correct given that the Plaintiff is now 47 and would have retired as a scaffolder at 56. The resulting total is $663,000 being $8,500 x 12 months x 6.5 years. To this I propose to add 5% for the employer’s MPF contribution which is $33,150. The total for future loss of earnings will therefore be $696,150.

I have fully compensated him for future loss of earnings and where I am content to say that he will not struggle in his alternative future employments, I propose a modest amount of $30,000.

There will be an order nisi that costs will be to the Plaintiff on the District Court Scale together with legal aid taxation of his costs.

03 September 2007

LO SIU NING v. CHAN KAI HING & LING KA KUI HCPI 301/2004

S’s words:-
I posted this case in my blog due to one major reason, that is, there are lots of useful case authorities being quoted, in particular, for the issue of PSLA that involves not only orthopaedic but also psychiatric evidence being considered.
Another interesting is that, the claim of the husband of the Plaintiff has been accepted by the Court. I am of the view that his claim should not an exceptional one of which it was not unreasonable for him to resign his work in order to take care of the Plaintiff for avoiding her suicide mind.
The judgment itself has not explained how the Court would agree that the Plaintiff could not earn more than $6,000.00 a month. Is it possible that the Court is now more willing to adopt a reasonable figure to ascertain the loss of future earnings?

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Judgment : 31 August 2007

Interlocutory judgment on liability was obtained on 20 May 2004 with damages to be assessed.

PSLA
Mr. Lam had referred me to the following authorities and submitted that an award of HK$600,000 is appropriate.

Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Depression
(a) Yan Kwok Yue v Dong Shu Kei Beau (High Court Personal Injuries Action No. 923 of 2000, Deputy High Court Judge Longley, 22nd January 2002, [2002] HKLJ 213) – an award of HK$500,000;
(b) Tsui Ho and Others v The Incorporated Owners of Albert House and Others (High Court Personal Injuries Action No. 828 of 1997, The Hon. Suffiad J., 17th September 2001, [2001] HKLJ 534) – an award of HK$525,000;
(c) Ng Pak Mui and Others v The Incorporated Owners of Albert House and Others (High Court Personal Injuries Action No. 828 of 1997, The Hon. Suffiad J., 17th September 2001, [2001] HKLJ 532) – an award of HK$430,000;
(d) Joan Carol Boivin v Wong King Yin and Another (High Court Personal Injuries Case No. 195 of 2000, The Hon. Suffiad J., 14th February 2001, [2001] HKLJ 171) – an award of HK$475,000;
(e) Yu Heung Yuk v Ho Man and Others (High Court Personal Injuries Action No. 57 of 1998, The Hon. Longley Deputy J., 12th August 1999, [1999] HKLRD 386) – an award of HK$440,000;

Orthopaedic Injury
(f) Yu Pun Yuen v Ng Kwok Man trading as East Mountain Engineering Company (Bankrupt) and Others (High Court Personal Injuries Action No. 293 of 2002, The Hon. Suffiad J., 9th May 2003, [2003] HKLJ 494) – an award of HK$450,000;
(g) Li Kwok Lo v Café de Coral Holdings Limited (High Court Action No. 804 of 2001, The Hon. Day Deputy J., 5th November 2002, [2002] HKLJ 723) – an award of HK$360,000; and
(h) Chow Wai Ming v Chan Yuk Charm (High Court Personal Injuries Action No. 1111 of 1996, The Hon. Woolley Deputy J., 13th October 1999, [1999] HKLJ 492) – an award of HK$300,000.

Mr. Lin, Counsel for the Defendant, referred the Court to the following authorities:

(i) Chan Sui Youn v Ng Kam Man (HCPI 533/1999, Recorder Ronny Wong, SC, 28 July 2000);
(ii) Chiu Wing Sze Karby v Chan Ying Wai (HCPI 616/1999, Deputy Judge Muttrie, 2 April 2001); and
(iii) Yung Wun v Kum Shing (K.F.) Construction Company Ltd (HCPI 679/2004, Deputy Judge Muttrie, 27 June 2007).

Mr. Lin submitted that the award under this head should not exceed $150,000.

It should be noted that, from orthopaedic view, the Plaintiff had made a good recovery from her physical injury though there is residual pain for the soft tissue injuries of the back and lower limbs.

While Dr. Wong and Dr. Chung were of the view that the Plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, they differed about the seriousness of depression that the Plaintiff was suffering.

I have considered the authorities cited by counsel and the disabilities suffered by the Plaintiff. In all the circumstances of this case, the reasonable and fair award under this head is $400,000.

Post-trial loss of earnings
The Plaintiff was 40 years old at the time of the accident and is now almost 45 years old.

Mr. Lam submitted that the court should adopt a multiplier of 10 and refer the court to the following authorities:

(a) Kwan Shek Sang v Chan Kam Wah trading as Wing Wah Air-Conditioning Engineering (a firm) (HCPI 872/2000, Suffiad J, 9 June 2003)
(b) Ho Shu Yau v Lo Siu Ling (formerly trading as Chi Wo Civil Engineering Company) and another (HCPI 1336/2000, Master M. Yuen, 31 January 2002)
(c) Luk Chi Yin v Wong Fung Shing (HCPI 496/1997, Deputy Judge Jackson, 6 November 1998)
(d) Sung Fuk Wah v Lam Wai Leuk (HCA 3676/1994, Master O’Donnell, 13 March 1995)

I am of the view that a multiplier of 9 is appropriate in all the circumstances of this case.

I accept Mr. Lam’s submission that the Plaintiff could earn at the most $6,000/month by reason of her disability and the conditions of the current labour market.

Loss of Earning Capacity

As Browne LJ said in Moliker v A Reyrolle & Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 132, 142 A-C

“The consideration of this head of damages should be made in two stages. (1) Is there a “substantial” or “real” risk that a Plaintiff will lose his present job at some time before the estimated end of his working life? (2) If there is (but not otherwise), the court must assess and quantify the present value of the risk of the financial damage which the Plaintiff will suffer if that risk materialize, having regard to the degree of the risk, the time when it may materialize, and the factors, both favourable and unfavourable, which in a particular case will, or may, affect the Plaintiff’s chances of getting a job at all, or an equally well paid job.”

It is clear that the Plaintiff is handicapped to certain extent by reasons of her residual disabilities and mental problems. I make a global award of $50,000 under this head.

Loss of earnings of the Plaintiff’s husband
Mr. Ma, who was a delivery worker earning $9,000/month, quitted his work on 18 August 2004 in order to take care of the Plaintiff and to prevent her from killing herself. Mr. Ma returned to work in October 2006.

The Plaintiff only claimed such loss for 18 months totaling $162,000 ($9,000 x 18).

I accept the evidence of Mr. Ma and find that it is reasonable for him to adopt the course as he did in order to take care of the Plaintiff.

CHANG CHIN TSAI v. SHUM KIN WONG & HONG KONG & CHINA TRANSPORTATION CONSTRUCTION LIMITED HCPI 1048/2006

S’s words:-
A simple traffic accident case. The ground of convenience is again pleaded by the Defendants as their Defence. Further, no evidence has been suggested by the Defendants for explaining the relationship of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. If I am right, there is something called “Sanderson costs order”. However, it is too early for one to suggest whether the same is applicable.

However, it is obvious that the Plaintiff should be entitled for some compensation. In no doubt, if he could find a suitable lawyer to represent him, he could present much a better picture of his case to the Court.

Why he is now unrepresented? I don’t want to speculate. But, with his previous calculation of his claim over HK$20,000,000.00, I would also refuse to act for him.

--- quote from judgment ---

判決書日期 : 2007年8月 31日

原告向兩被告追討人身受傷賠償 $29,251,000,扣除被告承認要負擔的10%共分疏忽責任,申索額淨值為 $26,325,900。

關家靜聆案官在2007年4月25日將這案轉介至區域法院,關聆案官認為原告若勝訴的話,法庭判給他的賠償也不會超過 100萬元,故作出此安排。原告現就這命令提出上訴。

第一被告因這意外被控不小心駕駛。他在2004年7月27日在荃灣裁判處承認控罪。

第一和第二被告經代表律師存檔了抗辯書,否認原告的指控,他倆在抗辯書更說意外是由原告的不小心造成,他倆也否認了互相的僱傭或代理關係,但沒有說明當時第二被告是否擁有該小巴或第一被告當時為何會駕駛該小巴。他們更指第一被告在荃灣裁判處承認不小心駕駛,只是為了節省時間和金錢而無奈地承認了控罪,但他們說第一被告的定罪並不等於原告無須負上疏忽的責任。

兩被告反對這上訴,代表他們的陳律師說關聆案官是有權把這案轉介到區域法院。陳律師更引用 Hang Seng Credit Card Ltd v Tsang Nga Lee, HCA 13228/1999 和Wong Miu Kwan v FPD Savills Property Management Ltd, HCPI 1061/2003作參考。

有關本院轉介案件到區域法院的原則,陳律師引用了石輝法官在Wong Miu Kwan案的第21段判詞,石輝法官說當聆案官要決定是否把本院的案件轉介至區域法院時,除了要考慮原告承認已收到的僱員補償和原告承認要負的共分疏忽責任外,還要考慮下列3點:

“ (a) In the absence of abuse, a plaintiff should be entitled to frame his case in the manner that he wishes.
(b) At an interlocutory stage, it would not be proper for the court or a master to view the plaintiff’s claim in the same way as it would be viewed at trial by weighing the different evidence or by believing or disbelieving some or all of the evidence. That exercise can only be carried out when all the evidence, cross-examination and submission has been heard, particularly where there are factual and or other disputes between the parties, as for instance disputed expert opinion.
(c) Accordingly, the plaintiff’s case on quantum as framed by him ought to be viewed at its highest when determining the proper jurisdiction where the case should be brought.”
「 (a) 原告只要不濫用司法程序,是有權選擇以甚麼方式擬定他的案情。
(b) 在非正審階段,法庭或聆案官不應像正審般去衡量不同的證據或選取某些或全部證據,以審視原告的申索,這步驟應在聆聽了所有證據、盤問和陳詞後才進行,特別是與案雙方在事實或其他方面有爭議,例如有不同的專家意見。
(c) 在決定案件的合適司法管轄權時,應以原告擬定的申索最高額為準。」(譯文)

上述兩個案件的原告所受的傷痛都比本案原告嚴重,所以本案原告應得的痛苦和失去生活情趣的賠償應是低於他們的數額,陳律師說原告在這項賠償應得的數額不會超過 $300,000。本席認為這說法合理。

本席認為石輝法官在Wong Miu Kwan案所指的濫用司法程序,必定包括原告人憑空作出的大額和沒有基礎的索償行為,本案原告要求的$29,251,000賠償,正是這種行為,所以關聆案官不理會這些申索而把這案轉介到區域法院是對的。

基於上述分析和理由,本席認為這上訴是沒有理據,所以本席現撤銷這上訴,本席並作出臨時訟費令,要原告就這上訴支付訟費予兩被告,若與案各方在14天內不就這臨時命令提出修定申請,這命令將在14天後自動作實。

10 August 2007

NG TIM YIP KEVIN v. CHAN HO KIN (formerly trading as KENNY’S ENGINEERING COMPANY) HCPI 948/2005

S’s words:-

Another plaintiff has failed to establish a claim against his former employer. One of the defence of the Defendant was that the Plainitiff was not his employee. That “standard” and “usual” defence was not accepted by the Court, not surprisingly.

However, if the Defendant did agree the Plaintiff an employee at the very first beginning, the Defendant would have his insurers (and the solicitors of the insurers) to assist his case. Thus, is it always preferable to suggest a plainitiff not his/her employee? It is too difficult to set up a formula, and also, in many occasions the defendant’s insurers would draw their own conclusions leaving the disappointing employer to consider arbitration.

Never mind. The Honourable Court in this action did conclude that the works assigned to the Plaintiff was a simple task and the accident was caused due to the fact that the Plaintiff (and his colleague) failed to follow the instructions of the Defendant. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed.

--- quote from judgment ---

It is the plaintiff’s case that he started working for the defendant in about September 2002 as an apprentice in repair and maintenance of water plumbing and electrical work. The plaintiff was only 17 at the time.

On the day of the accident, the plaintiff, still an apprentice, was assigned by the defendant to dismantle drainage pipes at the Site. That work of dismantling was carried out by the plaintiff working together with another apprentice of the defendant by the name of Ah Cheong.

At about 5.30 p.m. when the two of them had dismantled a section of the drainage pipe which weighed about 100 lbs, and both of them were carrying the dismantled pipe, one at each end, the colleague of the plaintiff slipped letting fall his end of the dismantled pipe. As a result, and because the plaintiff could not get away in time, the plaintiff’s right hand was crushed by the dismantled pipe thereby causing very serious injuries to the plaintiff’s right hand and fingers.

Counsel for the plaintiff, in his opening, based the negligence of the defendant to be as follows :

(a) insufficient manpower allocated by the defendant to carry the heavy dismantled pipe;
(b) failure of the defendant to be present and to properly supervise the work of two inexperienced apprentice;
(c) failure to give proper training and instructions to the plaintiff and his colleague;
(d) failure to provide a proper platform for the work of dismantling; and
(e) failure to provide the proper tools or equipment to properly transport the dismantled pipe.

In so far as the working relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant goes, I have no difficulty accepting the plaintiff’s evidence that he was the employee of the defendant, even taking into account the terms of the employment contract between them.

From the findings above, there can be no doubt but that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and therefore at the time of the accident, the defendant was under the duty to the plaintiff to act as an employer.

Given the findings above, there was no good reason for the plaintiff to have ignored the instructions of the defendant to cut the pipe into smaller pieces or sections for dismantling, I find this accident to have come about because of the failure of the plaintiff to follow the instructions that he was given by the defendant.

The work involved in this case was not work which involved any great complexity. It has never been challenged by the plaintiff that the defendant had given them full instructions as to how to cut and dismantle the water pipe.

For the reasons given, I do not find any negligence on the part of the defendant. The accident came about only because of the plaintiff’s failure to follow the instructions given to him to cut the pipe into manageable sections.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.

23 July 2007

TAI MEI LIN v. FUNG KING KONG & LEE MAN YI MANDY HCPI 425/2006

S’s words:-

The Plaintiff being the mother of the 1st Defendant commenced the action against inter alia her own son. The issue whether it is appropriate to claim the 2nd Defendant being the owner of the subject car was not discussed and I would not make any comment thereto.

However, this case was not purely a claim from a passenger claiming against his own driver but is a case that a mother claiming against her own son for negligent driving. It is definitely too difficult for the insurers to defend such a claim (on behalf of the Defendants or otherwise). Thus, if I were the solicitors for the Defendants, I believe a quick settlement should be preferred.

The Defence of undertaking “an emergency manoeuvre to avoid a collision with” a vehicle.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Judgment: 12 July 2007

Just after midnight on 25 May 2003 the plaintiff Madam Tai was one of four passengers in a Honda saloon car driven by her son Fung King Kong the 1st defendant.

But there was an accident. As they approached a slight left hand bend in the road Mr Fung caused the car to swerve to the left and it struck railings bordering the carriageway.

Madam Tai has not fully recovered and remains permanently partially disabled. By this action she is suing the driver, her son, and the owner of the car, Mandy Lee, the 2nd defendant, for her consequential loss arising out of Mr Fung’s negligent driving.

The defence as pleaded by both defendants and adduced in evidence is that Mr Fung was undertaking an emergency manoeuvre to avoid a collision with a public light bus. The PLB had emerged from the exit of a petrol station that was on the right hand side of Tai Tong Road and had turned right into the lane occupied by the Honda and just ahead of it. To avoid hitting the PLB Mr Fung had no alternative but to swerve to the left. But this action took him into a collision path with the railings which brought the car to a sudden and violent stop. Mr Fung was not negligent or responsible for the accident or his mother’s injuries; that was entirely the fault of the driver of the PLB.

It seems to me that the PLB emerged because its driver believed that he had adequate room and time to manoeuvre safely, and that this was probably a correct decision. Had there been a danger of an imminent collision the sudden prospect of danger would have been evident to Mr Fung’s passengers.

Mr Fung, an inexperienced driver with as he put it not very good skills, driving a car he had not driven before, over-reacted. If he were at all concerned about the proximity of the PLB the appropriate course would have been to brake and if necessary brake hard, to allow the PLB to accelerate away, and otherwise hold his line.

The course he took, of swerving at speed into the railings, was inappropriate, and the sole or at least primary cause of the accident.

12 July 2007

CHAN WAI YING the Administratrix of the Estate and on behalf of the dependants of TSAI CHUNG YUNG deceased v. SIN KIT SANG & Others HCPI 805/2006 (2)

S’s words:-
A few days ago I have just mentioned a judgment made by PI Master that rejected two expert reports on liability be adduced. On 10th July 2007, when the same case was heard by way of rehearing before a single judge, a different conclusion was made.
It is not necessary for me to quote the legal principles again (which is not in dispute).
With due respect, I do not intend to challenge the decision of the PI Master.
However, at least now we can say Lamborghini being a high performance racing car can amount to an extraordinary case that expert evidence on speed can be allowed.
Is it possible that with the support of this case authority, the defendants would again try their efforts to convince judges/masters to allow adducing similar expert reports on liabilty?
Fortunately, we do not have many Lamborghini or other racing cars involved in personal injuries claim.

--- quote from judgment

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Gill in Chambers

Date of Ruling: 10 July 2007

In circumstances and for reasons I shall come to, the 3rd and 4th defendants as a prelude to trial applied to a Master for leave to admit in evidence two reports compiled by Professor Murray McKay. Professor McKay is a pre-eminent expert in the field of road traffic accident investigation and reconstruction.

This is an appeal by rehearing from the Master’s refusal to allow in the second of the two reports.

Determination
Is this an exceptional case?

First, there are witnesses and these include bystanders with no interest in the outcome. But it is likely there will be no reliable account of speed and distances. The capabilities of the Lamborghini are well outside those of the conventional saloon car, and thus outside the experience that a witness and judge can bring to the judicial process.

Secondly, there is already admitted in evidence an expert’s report, and the right for either party to have the author called to be cross-examined on it. But he is a witness of neither party and for different reasons all defendants are critical of his methodology and conclusions. If there is already expert evidence available to the court which one party or another finds wanting, should not that party be entitled to call his own expert to counter it?

In my view, commonsense and justice requires me to treat this case with its particular circumstances as one which falls into the exceptional category; one which calls for an expert with particular expertise of the attributes of a high performance sports car as this Lamborghini.

This will not, as I find, amount to a trial by expert, or experts. This will not be to usurp the proper function of judge, whose role will remain to determine the facts and draw such inferences as he may from them.

In the circumstances, I allow the appeal and grant the application. There will be consequential leave for the 1st and 2nd defendants to call an expert on terms to be agreed, with liberty to apply.

10 July 2007

CHAN WAI YING the Administratrix of the Estate and on behalf of the dependants of TSAI CHUNG YUNG deceased v. SIN KIT SANG & Others HCPI 805/2006

S’s words:-
Another classical case that an application for adducing expert evidence on liability is rejected. Lamborghini being the subject vehicle of the traffic accident involved could not convince the Court that it was an extraordinary case.

---

Date of Handing Down : 31 May 2007

“This is my Decision on the Application by ... , the solicitors for the 3rd and the 4th defendants for leave to adduce 2 expert’s reports compiled by Professor McKay. One report relates to the seatbelt issue, and the other relates to liability.

This action arises out of a road traffic accident on 25 July 2004. The deceased was a 46 year old contractor who had boarded the 3rd defendant’s taxi just before the Lamborghini driven by the 1st defendant ploughed into the side of the taxi, as the taxi was making a U-turn. The deceased sustained serious injuries and died soon after.

As was explained by Stuart Smith LJ in the famous case of Liddell v Middleton, 1996 PIQR 36, that section of the legislation “in no way extends the principles upon which expert evidence is admissible.” His Lordship went on to say that “An expert is only qualified to give expert evidence on a relevant matter, if his knowledge and expertise relate to a matter which is outside the knowledge and experience of a layman. And the reference to an “issue in the proceedings in question” relates to a factual issue and not to the conclusion of law based upon such fact.”

The case of Liddell V Middleton was quoted with approval by Mr Justice Seagroatt in Cho Kam Chuen v Tse Chi Hung, HCPI 170/2000.

An authority in the area of admissibility of expert evidence which provides a helpful summary is the judgment of the Mr Justice Suffiad in Chan Kwok Ming v Hitachi Electrical Service (HK) Ltd, HCPI 322 of 2002. The judge sets out the proper criteria to be applied to determine whether any expert report can and should be admitted in evidence in paragraphs 20 to 27, explaining how the elements of relevance, necessity and probative value are to be applied.

n summary therefore, in the application of the relevant principles on whether to give leave to adduce evidence of expert witnesses, the following matters must be considered: (a) whether the proposed expert witness has the requisite qualifications; (b) whether his “knowledge and expertise” is outside the knowledge and experience of the layman, i.e. will his evidence be “relevant” within the meaning of Liddell v Middleton; (c) whether the expert’s evidence will only “relate to a factual issue and not to a conclusion of law based upon such fact” within the meaning of Liddell v Middleton; (d) Whether the applicant complied with the procedure set out in O38 r36; and (e) Whether the applicant has shown that the “expert evidence” is “necessary”, “relevant”, and has “probative value” within the meaning of the Judgment in HCPI 322 of 2002.

Based on that evidence of contact with the interior of the taxi, Professor McKay built up his argument on the seatbelt issue. That piece of evidence showing points of contact between the deceased and places inside the taxi would have been available to the trial judge without the McKay report. There is no reason why the trial judge cannot apply his common sense in the same manner as the Professor. Moreover, it has not been shown that the contents of the report relate to anything “outside the knowledge and experience of a layman”. It is not outside the knowledge and experience of a layman that a person not wearing a seatbelt would probably have hit his head against the window frame and the pillar between the front and rear doors. It is not outside the knowledge and experience of a layman that a person not wearing a seatbelt would probably have sustained the laceration to his liver when the right side of his body was thrown violently against the door. For all the reasons given, I find that the criteria of “relevance”, “necessity” and “probative value” are not met, and decline leave to adduce the report dealing with the seatbelt issue.

I am of the view that the trial judge, armed with all the materials from the Magistrates’ Court and with all the oral evidence of the witnesses, will be in a position to decide whether the taxi driver was negligent when he made that U-turn, thereby placing the flank of his taxi directly in the path of the Lamborghini. Furthermore, the trial judge will only need to work out the approximate speed of the oncoming vehicle when the taxi started the U-turn. Knowledge of the exact speed of the Lamborghini will not be necessary in the circumstances, as there is also information of the locus in quo in the form of sketches, photographs, agreed distances and the evidence of several eyewitnesses.

For all the reasons given, I dismiss the application by the 3rd and 4th defendants to adduce the reports compiled by Professor McKay both dated 17.2.07 on the seatbelt issue and on the liability issue.”

CHENG YUK CHUN v. WINSON CLEANING SERVICE COMPANY LIMITED & OTHERS DCPI 629/2006

S’s words:-
This is a slipped and fell case of which the Plaintiff fell and injured in the Staircase that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants were the occupiers and the 1st Defendant being the management company.
The Plaintiff failed her claim due to the fact that the Court was not convinced that the accident was taken place as she did have mentioned.
However, if the accident happened due to the oily and slippery condition of the Staircase, the Judge did have expressed his view that the 1st Defendant (but not the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) would be wholly liable for the accident.
The issue of contributory negligence (if found the 1st Defendant being liable due to the oily and slippery condition) was also considered. Ng Siu Cho v the Incorporated Owners of Jardine Court, unrep., DCPI 976/2005, 6/7/2006’s case was relied on but the Court took the view that the Plaintiff could have done much to avoid the risk of slipping on the Staircase when having to understandably hurry with her work.
So, we have to be careful as to how to distinguish Ng Siu Cho’s case (if for the Plaintiff) or rely on Ng Siu Cho’s case (if for the Defendant) in future. The first version of how the accident being taken place given by the Plaintiff is critical.

---

Date of handing down judgment : 6 July 2007

"In this action, the 43-year-old lady cleaner claims against the Defendants for personal injuries sustained during work in 2004. At the material time, the 1st Defendant was her employer. The 2nd Defendant was the management company of the property which contracted the 1st Defendant for cleaning service. The 3rd Defendant was the owners’ incorporation of the property.

It was part of her morning routine to collect the garbage from the back staircases of each floor of the Block. She would put the garbage into one of the wastebaskets, which she brought for such purpose, and then move the basket of garbage to the Ground Floor. The garbage collected would be centralised on the Ground Floor and would be collected by a garbage truck.

The Plaintiff started work at about 7:00 am that day. At about 7:45 am, she started collecting garbage from the 29th Floor of the Block downwards floor by floor. At about 8:30 am, she was moving a basket filled with garbage and descending along the staircase from the 6th to the 5th Floor (“the Staircase”). In the course of that, she fell and injured, among other parts, her right wrist.

The Plaintiff claims against the 1st Defendant for breach of the implied contractual duty of employer. She claims against the 2nd and the 3rd Defendants as the occupiers of the scene of the accident. Against all Defendants, the Plaintiff also alleges breach of statutory duties as well as the general duty not to be negligent.

Except for the alleged statutory duties on the part of the 2nd and the 3rd Defendant, the existence of the various kinds of duty on the respective parties was not in real dispute. The dispute was essentially whether any of them was in breach and whether the accident was contributed to by the Plaintiff’s own negligence.

Nevertheless, considering all the evidence including those specifically analysed above, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff fell because she slipped on wet or oily surface of the Staircase at the material time. I find Mr. Chan, the occupational safety officer, to be a reliable witness. I find that on the balance of probabilities, the accident did happen in the way as Plaintiff told him and was recorded in her declaration and the accident report.

In view of my finding of how the Plaintiff came to fall on the Staircase, there is really no sufficient factual basis for finding fault in the 1st Defendant’s system of work.

The 2nd and the 3rd Defendant, which were undeniably occupiers of the staircase, should not be to blame either in the circumstances.

Assuming breach
For completeness, I proceed to consider whether any of the Defendants should be liable and the apportionment of liability if I am wrong above. In other words, what if the accident happened due to the oily and slippery condition of the Staircase at the time as alleged.

Mr. Cheung for the 1st Defendant submitted, and I agree, that the 1st Defendant should not be liable for the accident to the extent as being caused by some known and ordinary risk in the course of the Plaintiff’s carrying out her basically simple and routine duty in this case. The cases of Mawson v Unilever [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 198, Winter v Cardiff Rural District Council [1950] 1 All ER 819 and Cheung Suk Wai v AG [1996] HKC 288 illustrate this. This however would not have addressed all the Plaintiff’s allegations.

I mentioned above the Plaintiff’s complaint about having to work under great time pressure. The garbage removal should be completed by 9:00 am as specified by the service contract between the 1st and the 2nd Defendant. The garbage truck would first stop by the Block at about 9:00-9:30 am to collect the garbage before proceeding down slope to the other blocks of the Estate. She had effectively less than 2 hours to remove all the garbage from the 29 floors of the Block by herself. She also explained her experience of having missed the truck. Not calling any witness at the trial, the 1st Defendant had nothing to effectively contradict this part of the Plaintiff’s evidence. Though there was dispute over whether the Plaintiff could have used the residents’ lift, it sounds credible that priority had to be given to residents during the morning rush hours which were indeed the hours of the Plaintiff’s work. The Plaintiff effectively had to hurry with her work along the Staircase by herself. Unlike Cheung Suk Wai, the Plaintiff had to work under a tight time schedule and would not really have been in a position to regulate her own pace and to decide her manner of work. This effectively deprived her of real alternative to avoid the risk of slipping and falling due to the condition of the Staircase.

Therefore, had I found that the accident was caused by the alleged wet and slippery condition of the Staircase; I would have found the 1st Defendant liable.

The Plaintiff was not a mere outside visitor to the Staircase but the very servant of the 1st Defendant responsible for cleaning it. She did admit in her evidence that she was responsible for cleaning the Staircase in question after collecting the garbage. There was no evidence to support that the risk associated with the condition of the Staircase was so exceptional that it was not reasonably incidental to the Plaintiff’s cleaning work. I agree with Mr. Gidwani that the 2nd and the 3rd Defendants could have justifiably relied on section 3(3)(b) of the Occupier’s Liability Ordinance, Cap. 314 in respect of the discharge of their common duty of care.

Even if the 2nd or the 3rd Defendant was somehow liable to the Plaintiff, I am of the view that the ultimate responsibility should in the circumstances still have lied with the 1st Defendant. The 2nd and the 3rd Defendants would have been entitled to full indemnity from the 1st Defendant against any of their liabilities to the Plaintiff due to the accident.

Contributory negligence
Mr. Gidwani for the 2nd and the 3rd Defendants submitted that contributory negligence in this case should be 25%, referring to the case of Ng Siu Cho v the Incorporated Owners of Jardine Court, unrep., DCPI 976/2005, 6/7/2006. I assume that Mr. Cheung for the 1st Defendant adopted that submission. I do not see that the Plaintiff could have done much to avoid the risk of slipping on the Staircase (which is assumed to be wet and slippery) when having to understandably hurry with her work. The circumstances simply differ from those in Ng Siu Cho. I would have found no contributory negligence."

08 July 2007

孫有興 v. 廖少冰 DCPI 1292/2005

S’s words:-

This is a personal injuries claim that the injured being the Plaintiff claimed against a dog owner for his injuries sustained from dog bites.

Certainly, the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff in this case were rather severe and it is not so common to happen. However, bearing in mind that it is quite unusual for a dog owner to have his own insurers in relation to his dog. Therefore, if a dog owner does not take care of his own dog, an unexpected result may happen.

Psychological impact on an injured suffering from dog bites should be expected. susi yanti & Anor v chu shiu-chuen‘s case is one of the authority to support that and now we have another updated case authority as another example.

---

判案書日期: 2007年6月 25日

原告人於2002年9月23日遭到被告人所飼養的狗咬傷,被告人因而被刑事起訴及定罪。其後原告人提出本訴訟,並於2006年11月17日取得法院的非正審判決, 判令被告人須就原告人之人身損害作出賠償,唯賠償金額則有待評估。 遂有今次聆訊。

意外發生時,身為郵差的原告人正在踏着腳踏車執行派遞郵件職務。在行經被告人家門前被涉案的狗咬傷左腳,並從腳踏車跌下。原告人其後被救護車送往醫院醫治。

原告人留醫共18天。期間接受了两次手術:入院當天傷口即進行了清創及敷料;約两星期後進行了植皮手術,當中需要從左大腿內側取皮。原告人於出院後,需要覆診和為傷口拆綫,並接受了為期超過1個月的物理治療,及為期1年為控制腳上傷疤的壓力衣治療。

原告人獲發為期約2個月的病假,自2002年12月始恢復其郵差的職務,直至現在。

原告人現聲稱左腿因患處影响,移動時覺緊。左小腿至腳趾時覺麻痺。傷疤的位置時感痕癢。他聲稱其性生活亦受影响。

這次意外對原告人的心理也造成影响。他稱自此對狗隻產生恐懼,時有睡夢中因憶起意外經過或被狗追咬而驚醒。他曾接受心理治療。

疼痛、痛苦及生活便利的喪失

cheang kam ian v hong kong prime printing company, hcpi 143/1998, 13 january 2000, suffiad j

原告人是一名17歲的男送貨工人。右小腿受燙傷而導致5%人身損害,两次留院合共12天。專家認為原告人除了餘痛外,身體並無機能上的損失。另傷疤屬永久性,導致2-5%人身損害。漂白或雷射治療或可略為舒緩其礙眼程度。法庭最終判給HK$200,000.00。

susi yanti & Anor v chu shiu-chuen, hcpi 1176/2000, 2 november 2001, master de souza

两名原告人均被狗咬傷。第一原告人是20歲的女傭。她的身體多處受傷及留有傷疤,其中分佈包括右腿有不下19處;左小腿有4處;右臂有2處。整體儀容永久受損5%。另外她因意外患上了精神問題。法庭判給HK$380,000.00。第二原告人只得4歲。她的大腿及左臂均有幾處傷痕。考慮到她於成長期會因為傷疤而感到尷尬,法庭判給HK$130,000.00。

leung yuk kwan v maple professional beauty centre ltd, hcpi 274/2002, 4 december 2002, master de souza

原告人年22歲,於抽脂瘦身療程中右腳嚴重受創,留有傷疤,4年後或有改善。儀容永久受損3%。法庭判給HK$300,000.00。

achacoso, warly cabaneros v liu man kuen, hcpi 121/2001, 11 june 2004, master hui

原告人是一名28歲女傭,已婚及有4名子女,因受傭主虐待令一雙手背燙傷,歷時1個月才痊愈。她的傷口留有傷疤,除影响她提携重物的能力外,還非常疼痛及敏感。雖然傷疤至今已大有改善,但避免不了被察覺到。法庭理解她的特殊經歷,最終判給HK$280,000.00。

mujiati v chong wai kwan, dcpi 424/2003, 21 October 2004, judge wong

原告人是一名年21歲的女傭,分別於两年內两次被狗咬傷。第一次傷及雙臂。她接受了防疫注射及藥物治療。第二次傷及前臂及臀部,傷口極深。這些創傷遺下多處礙眼的傷疤,除令她感尷尬外,還+分痕癢。鑑於原告人並無因而對狗產生恐懼,及比較其他案件,法庭最終判給HK$70,000.00。

考慮過本案原告人的實況,其中包括個人背景、受傷程度、治療過程所經歷的痛苦、身體的永久損害、身體及心理上的後遺症,本席認為就原告人疼痛、痛苦及喪失生活便利的合理賠償應為HK$200,000.00。