Showing posts with label Bankruptcy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bankruptcy. Show all posts

13 December 2007

RE LI SAU YING HCMP002384/2007

S’s words:-

First of all, the Debtor suggested that the staff of the Unrepresented Litigants Resource Centre told her the wrong number of days to commence an appeal procedure against bankruptcy order. I believe that in our profession there are lot of people who do not know the differnce of the usual 28 days from the 21 days as prescribed by Section 98(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. Thus, it is also not surprised that the Centre might wrongly inform the Debtor the same.

Fortunately, it should be expected that such a difference will be resolved after the passing of the Bankruptcy (Amendment ) Ordinance in future. In any event, it is still the existing bankruptcy law that an appeal should be made within 21 days and further, if extension of time is required, an application before the bankruptcy judge is required (but not to make the application to the Court of Appeal).

It thus explains that up to this moment, bankruptcy law is still not an easy subject at all with something different from the usual civil rules.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of reasons for decision: 11 December 2007

On 31 October 2007, Deputy Judge L. Chan made a bankruptcy order against Li Sau Ying.

Appeals from orders given in bankruptcy proceedings are governed by s.98(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance Cap. 6. This section provides that every order of the court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the appeal should be commenced within 21 days from the time when the decision appealed against is pronounced or made. In the context of this case, the appeal should have been commenced within 21 days of 31 October 2007, i.e. by 21 November 2007.

Miss Li says on affirmation that she had been informed by the staff of the Unrepresented Litigants Resource Centre that the appeal period was 28 days, and therefore after preparing her Notice of Appeal on 22 November 2007, she sought to file it on 27 November 2007. Of course by then the appeal was out of time.

I pause to note that this was not the first case where litigants (even those with legal representation) had missed the deadline for appealing an order in bankruptcy proceedings because of the shorter time limit in s.98(2), as in ordinary civil proceedings the time limit is 28 days from the sealing of the order (see e.g. re Li Tat-kong [2003] 2 HKC 72, Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Edward Ho [2003] 3 HKLRD L4, re Lau Kwok Fai, Bernard HCMP2224/2005). Happily this anomaly has now been addressed by way of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance, which however does not apply to the present case.

Coming back to this case, on 27 November 2007 Miss Li had to make an application to extend time for appealing. This was done by way of a summons which was filed in Miscellaneous Proceedings. The summons was fixed to be heard by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The Petitioner opposed Miss Li’s application. In Mr Wong’s written submissions on behalf of the Petitioner he argued that the application for extension of time to appeal was governed by r.204 of the Bankruptcy Rules which provides:

“ The court may, under special circumstances and for good cause shown, extend or abridge the time appointed by these rules or fixed by any order of the court for doing any act or taking any proceeding”.

In written submissions, the Official Receiver submitted that Bankruptcy Rule 204 did not apply to appeals because the time limit for appeals was fixed by s.98(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, not by the Bankruptcy Rules. Mr Wong rightly conceded this at the hearing.

The Official Receiver pointed out in his written submissions that applications to appeal an order made in bankruptcy proceedings are governed by s.100(4) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, which provides:

“ Where by this Ordinance or by general rules the time for doing any act or thing is limited, the court may extend the time either before or after the expiration thereof upon such terms, if any, as the court may think fit to impose”.

This however led to another problem – under s.2 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance,

“ ‘court’ means the Court of First Instance sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction”.

Mr Wong also referred to paras.59/4/12 and 59/4/14 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2008. However the Official Receiver argued (rightly in my view) that Order 1 rule 2(2) of the High Court Rules specifically provided that the High Court Rules did not have effect to bankruptcy provisions, and s.99 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance applied High Court Rules only where they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. As s.100(4) clearly stipulated that it was for the Court of First Instance sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction to consider applications thereunder, that would override any High Court Rules permitting the Court of Appeal to deal with applications for extension of time in ordinary civil actions.

In the circumstances, on Miss Li giving an undertaking that she will within 7 days make an application to the Court of First Instance sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction to extend time for appealing, I made no order on her application in these proceedings.

15 November 2007

HCB 9850/2002, HCB 17353/2002 and HCB 20609/2002

S’s words:-

The trustees in those three cases tried to ask the Court to vary the costs order. Without going into details of each case, I believe the Judgment of HCB 11719/2002 should be sufficient for me not to repeat any words further.

Is it a coincidence that different Judge(s)/Master(s) all rejected the trustees’ entitlement for costs in different cases?

Please re-consider your quasi-judicial obligation before making applications.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Decision (Handed Down): 13 November 2007

By their letter dated 29 October 2007, the trustees asked me to vary my order to the extent that they are not entitled to recover their costs of and occasioned in the hearing for directions before Master Kwang on 27 March 2007 only, which was the hearing for the interim order prolonging the bankruptcy of the bankrupt.

The trustees’ grounds 1 and 2 can be considered together. It is not necessary to go into detail of the trustees’ grounds in support of their application as they have withdrawn their application. This court had no opportunity of investigating into those grounds. The trustees chose not to withdraw their application after Judge Kwan’s judgment handed down on 9 January 2007. In fact, Judge Lam in Fred Lee v Liu Man Hoo HCB11719of 20002 unreported and Judge Barma in Fred Lee and Chow Wai Lan, Christine v Wong Hing Wah Michael HCB26018 of 2002 commented that the trustees should have raised the misconducts with the bankrupt after they had discovered such misconducts. They should not wait until the end of the bankruptcy order. They have failed to do so here.

The question remains: Were they discharging their quasi-judicial obligations? I repeat my reasons in paragraphs 9-11 of my Decision in Bankruptcy Proceedings No.9850 of 2002. I take the view that in exercising my discretion as to the trustees’ costs from the estate, I should take a global view of the matter, taking into consideration of all relevant factors. I hold that the trustees have not shown to me that they had taken reasonable investigation into the matter before they took out this application. This application has prolonged the bankrupt’s bankruptcy order unnecessarily. I do not consider that the trustees have discharged their quasi-judicial obligations.

For the reasons above, I confirm my order to disallow the trustees’ costs of their application from the estate. I also disallow their costs for this application from the estate.

14 November 2007

FRED LEE, trustee of the property of LIU MAN HOO, a bankrupt HCB 11719/2002

S’s words:-

The Trustee tried to make an application to vary the costs order regarding the Decision of the Court on 14th September 2007. In fact, as the Judge did have commented, “this is an application that should not have been brought in the first place.”

The quasi-judicial function of the trustees should be properly exercised, or otherwise, we may still have some cases that the Judge(s)/Master(s) may comment that such an application should not have been made at all.

Different Judge(s) and Master(s) have rightly pointed out the quasi-judicial obligation on the part of the trustees. Thus, the trustees should not raise applications for suspension as a norm but should take such necessary investigations beforehand.

In order to protect the interests of the creditors, we should not discourage the trustees to make applications, or otherwise, the trustees may choose to make no application at all even in suitable situations.

So, I wish I could have the chance to read more judgments that the trustees do have made investigations and submit applications with sufficient reasons. Some guidelines of the Court have already been given. It is the right time for the trustees to prepare their cases (including investigations) well. I further wish that we would not have the chance to read further judgments with groundless applications being put before the Court, but unforuntately, I cast some doubts thereon.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Decision on Costs : 13 November 2007

I made a costs order nisi in Para.87 of my Reasons for Decision of 14 September 2007. The Trustee applied for a variation of the order. At the hearing on 5 November 2007, I was invited by the Trustee to vary the costs order to no order as to costs.

The main plank of the Trustee’s argument is the finding by this court that the Bankrupt’s conduct before the commencement of the bankruptcy has been unsatisfactory and thus a case under Section 30A (4)(d) was established. Mr Chan submitted that in such circumstances, the Trustee was not at fault in the exercise of his judgment in applying for suspension. He also suggested that in these circumstances, the Bankrupt should not be regarded as the successful party in the application.

It is further submitted that though the court ultimately decided that there should not be any suspension, it was more in the nature of a grant of indulgence to the Bankrupt in the exercise of the discretion by the court.

Mr Chan also argued that given the quasi-judicial role of the Trustee, the normal rule of costs following event can be displaced more easily.

On the other hand, Mr Lam for the Bankrupt argued that the normal rule should apply and unless an exception under Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 can be established, the Bankrupt should get his costs. In the present case, counsel submitted that none of the exceptions applies. It was an application that should never have been brought in the first place. Mr Lam also contended that the Trustee had not been acting reasonably.

Hence, I am of the view that the normal rule should equally be applicable to this type of proceedings. But that is subject to the principle laid down in Ritter v Godfrey.

As regards the third exception in Ritter v Godfrey, Atkin LJ said at p.61 that it “extends to cases where the facts complained of, though they do not give the plaintiff a cause of action, disclose a wrong to the public by which I understand some criminal or quasi criminal misconduct, e.g. fraud or crime or preparation of for a fraud or crime, or possibly some act of serious oppression.” I do not think the unsatisfactory conducts which I found to be established against the Bankrupt come anywhere near to this category.

Thus, I will answer the first question by holding that there is no good reason for depriving the Bankrupt of his costs in resisting the application in the present case.

Turning to the incidence of such costs, it could either fall on the Trustee or the estate. Rule 32A(3) of the Bankruptcy Rules gives limited protection to a trustee regarding personal liability for costs. However, it does not apply here since the application was made by the Trustee instead of he being made a party to proceedings issued by other parties.

There cannot be any doubt that the court does have the power to order costs against a trustee personally if the circumstances warrant such sanction. On the other hand, such power should be exercised with circumspection when a trustee is performing his ‘quasi-judicial’ function properly.

In the appeal in Leung Chin Yeung CACV 32 of 2007, 23 October 2007, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Kwan J. Further, the Court of Appeal took the view that the appeal should never have been brought and ordered the trustee to pay the costs of the Official Receiver and the respondent on indemnity basis and not to recoup the costs of the appeal from the estate.

In the present case, I regret to say that the Trustee had adopted a fundamentally flawed approach towards this application. As I said in my Reasons for Decision, the Trustee did not make any meaningful investigation before he decided to launch the application. Further, the Trustee took the misconceived view that he was only concerned with establishing a ground of objection under Section 30A(4) and failed to address his mind to the more important issue, viz. whether the circumstances as a whole warrant an application for suspension being made. This amounts to a serious failure on his part to carry out his quasi-judicial function properly.

Mr Chan submitted that the Trustee did not have the benefit of the recent case law on the subject when the application was made. I do not regard this as a good excuse for the Trustee’s failings mentioned above. It is not too much for the court to expect a reasonably competent trustee to carry out proper investigation on all relevant matters before making an application. Unless this has been done, it is difficult to see how a trustee can make a proper and responsible decision on whether it is appropriate to make an application for suspension.

Further, the decision of Kwan J in Leung Chin Yeung should have alerted the Trustee to reconsider his approach to this application. Unfortunately, the Trustee chose to press on with a flimsy application.

Looking the matter in the round, I am of the view that no reasonable trustee carrying out his quasi-judicial function could have concluded on the materials available that he should launch an application for suspension if he took a balanced and impartial attitude towards the matter. This is an application that should not have been brought in the first place.

In my judgment, the Trustee had acted unreasonably in the application and the incidence of costs should not fall upon the creditors. I therefore vary my costs order nisi by ordering the Trustee to pay for the costs of the Bankrupt in the application including the costs of the hearing on the question of costs personally and the Trustee shall not recoup his costs from the estate.

01 November 2007

FRED LEE, trustee of the property CACV 30/2007, CACV 31/2007 and CACV 32/2007

S’s words:-

These three appeals were commented an appeal that should never have been brought.
More important, the Trustees in those three cases were required to pay for the costs of the appeal on INDEMNITY BASIS.

Further, with the support of the Court of Appeal, the judgment of Her Honourable Madam Justice Kwan on 9th January 2007 will be good guidelines for the trustees to decide whether to make objections.

As I have mentioned in other posts in this site, I do expect that we will have more cases in the future that the trustes could make much better objections. The incentive to make objections has been explained by these appeals that in each order in favour of the trustee, the like amount of the trustee’s costs may be in the region of $30,000.00.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Judgment: 23 October 2007

These were appeals from an order of Kwan J given on 9 January 2007 whereby the judge ordered that the 3 summons issued by the trustee in bankruptcy of three bankrupts be adjourned to the master and that, similarly, the joint applications for discharge made by the bankrupts and the trustee should likewise be adjourned back to the master to consider the merits of both applications with the guidance of the decision of 9 January 2007. The judge disallowed the trustee from recovering out of the bankrupts’ estates his costs of and occasioned in the hearing of 20 December 2006 before the judge.

The trustee in bankruptcy appealed the orders remitting the matter back to the master. He sought an order in each case that the summons issued by himself objecting to the automatic discharge of the bankrupts be allowed and he sought to appeal as to costs.

This court was concerned, for reasons which will emerge, that these appeals were incompetent in view of the stance taken on behalf of the trustee in the court below. Nevertheless, the court heard the matter on a de bene esse basis. The court considered that not only were there no grounds for appeal but the appeals should never have been brought. The appeals were therefore dismissed. The costs of the appeals of both the Official Receiver and the respondent to CACV 30 of 2007, who was represented in this court by counsel, were ordered to be paid by the trustee on an indemnity basis. The trustee was not to recoup the costs of the appeals from the estates. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the trustee conceded that he did not wish the interim suspension of the automatic discharge under section 30A(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance Cap. 6 (“the Ordinance”) to continue, those orders were discharged.

The manner in which these applications have come before the court justifiably led to the concern that the decision to abandon the opposition to the automatic discharge was taken solely on the basis that there would be some further contribution, albeit in some of the cases of almost negligible interest to the creditors, and a substantial contribution to the trustee’s costs of bringing the application to object to the automatic discharge. On that aspect, it might be observed that this court was told in the course of argument that 37 conditional discharge orders have already been made with the consent of the trustee. If each order provided for a like amount of $30,000 the total would come to $1,110,000. If similar consent orders were to be made in the 438 other cases in which the trustee has filed objection to automatic discharge, the amount involved would come to more than $13 million.

In those circumstances there is no question in my mind that these appeals should never have been brought. On that basis the appeals as to costs would have required leave; that had not been sought or obtained. Furthermore, it was not argued that the orders as to costs were not within the discretion of the court. In my view, the judge was correct in coming to the conclusion that the applications under section 30A(9) were joint applications by the trustee and the bankrupts. The circumstances of the volte face in originally applying that the periods for automatic discharge should cease to run and then seeking to withdraw the applications were not explained to the court. In the light of that I consider that the judge made the correct order in depriving the trustee of the costs of the hearing before her.

In this context I agree with the observations of the learned judge in her judgment – see [2007] 1 HKC 164 at 183H-184C – that “the trustee should not act too readily in deciding to object to automatic discharge”, that “the discretion to object should be exercised with caution” and that “an order of continued contribution to the estate as a condition to discharge should be made with restraint and circumspection”.

28 October 2007

FRED LEE and CHOW WAI LAN, CHRISTINE v. WONG HING WAH MICHAEL HCB 26018/2002

S’s words:-

A case that the trustees won.

However, please read CACV 30, 31 & 32 / 2007 as well.

In my own view, with more experience in making objections, I believe we will have more cases that are ruled against the bankrupts in the future.

The various case authorities, whether against or in favour of the trustees, are good examples/guidelines for the trustees to make objections in the future. Thus, planning can be made before objections are submitted.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Judgment : 12 October 2007

The grounds on which an order suspending an automatic discharge may be made are specified in section 30A(4) of the Ordinance.

The grounds on which the automatic discharge of Mr Wong from his bankruptcy are objected to were set out in an affirmation made by Mr Lee made in support of the application. Two matters were relied upon. Both were said to demonstrate unsatisfactory conduct on the part of Mr Wong in respect of the period before his bankruptcy.

The approach to the exercise of the discretion under section 30A(3)

As has been observed in a number of decisions, the introduction of the present section 30A of the Ordinance marked a significant change in the approach of the law towards bankrupts. Previously, there was no provision for automatic discharge. A bankrupt had to apply for his discharge, and it was generally difficult for him to obtain it. The effect of the change has been to place the emphasis on rehabilitation of the bankrupt so as to enable him to resume a normal life (see e.g. Re Hui Hing Kwok [1999] 3 HKC 683, per Le Pichon J at 687B).

So far as the power under section 30A(3) to suspend the automatic discharge of a bankrupt is concerned, it is, I think, clear that one of its main purposes is to provide the bankrupt with an incentive to cooperate with his trustee, and to comply with his obligations under the Ordinance. However, this cannot be its only purpose. If it were, there would be no point in including among the grounds for objection any reference to the pre-bankruptcy behaviour of the bankrupt. Other purposes that are served by the power to suspend automatic discharge would appear to me to include the protection of the public, where there is reason to think that the reintroduction of the bankrupt into ordinary commercial life might pose risks or dangers against which lenders and others who might have dealings with him should be protected, and, in appropriate cases, as a mark of disapproval of the way in which the bankrupt has conducted his affairs whether before or after his bankruptcy.

The court has recently considered the approach which should be adopted to objections to discharge in cases involving allegedly unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conduct in Lee Fred v Leung Chin Yeung [2007] 1 HKC 164 (Kwan J), Re Tong Yuk Kin (unreported, HCB 22870/2002, Deputy Judge A To, 20 June 2007) and Re Liu Man Hoo (unreported, HCB 11719/2002, Lam J, 14 September 2007). I should point out that the last of these decisions was given after the hearing in this matter concluded, and was not the subject of submissions by either party. However, the approach adopted in it is, I think, broadly in line with that taken in the other two decisions.

These authorities make it clear that there are two stages involved when the court is considering the exercise of its powers under section 30A(3). It is first necessary to determine whether one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30A(4) has been established. If this is done, the court then moves on to consider whether or not, in the exercise of its discretion, a suspension of the automatic discharge that would otherwise have been available to the bankrupt should be ordered. It will not be in every case where a ground for suspension is made out that a suspension will be called for or imposed. In determining whether or not a suspension should be ordered, the court will have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the acts complained of and the post-bankruptcy conduct of the bankrupt.

That said, bearing in mind the policy of rehabilitation, I would accept that save in very serious cases, a suspension of automatic discharge in respect of unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conduct is likely to be for a shorter period than might be ordered in a case in which a bankrupt had been guilty of other, post-bankruptcy ground for suspension, where a longer period of suspension may well be called for so as to ensure that the bankrupt properly complies with his obligations.

Taking account of the fact that there are no complaints as to Mr Wong’s post-bankruptcy conduct, and that he appears to have provided information to the Trustees as and when required, I have come to the view that a suspension of Mr Wong’s automatic discharge for a period of four months would be sufficient in this case. Accordingly, I shall order that the relevant period under section 30A(1) of the Ordinance shall cease to run, in the case of Mr Wong, for a period of four months. The effect will be that he is to be treated as having been discharged from his bankruptcy on 24 June 2007.

02 October 2007

FRED LEE, trustee of the property of WONG CHI WAI SUNMY, a bankrupt v. WONG CHI WAI SUNMY HCB12941/2002

S’s words:-
Will the Court give more and more judgment in favour of the bankrupts in relation to the application for suspension of automatic discharge on the part of the Trustees, in particular, the Trustee who regarded by the Court as having routinely done the same.

Lam J’s judgment in Liu Man Hoo HCB 11719 of 2002 in no doubt will be the guidelines in future of which the Master in Wong Chi Wai Sunmy’s case also adopts the same.

The pre-bankruptcy conducts of the Bankrupt were doubtful. But when the total contribution to the Official Receiver in thie case was considered, “which is more than half of proven debts”, “the excessive borrowing conduct may be brushed aside.” It thus explains why no creditor would take initiative to object the automatic discharge.

Finally, a pure academic issue, that is, the decision of Master Au Yeung (now Registrar Au Yeung) was again adopted of which the suspension was lifted with retorspective effect as per the decision of Official Receiver v Chan Kwok Keung, HCB 20772 of 2002.

--- quote from judgment ---

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 28 September 2007

Envisaging that the Application would not be disposed of immediately should Mr. Wong object to the Application, the Trustee, who seems to have routinely done so, also on the same date of the Application issued a summons for an interim order to prevent Mr. Wong from being automatically discharged from bankruptcy. This resulted in the granting of an interim order by a Master on 1 September 2006 which order was further extended on 6 March 2007. The interim orders had been de facto preventing Mr. Wong from the automatic discharge until the Application was determined on 24 September 2007.

Before I handed down the judgment, Lam J on 14 September 2007 handed down a decision of Fred Lee, trustee of the property of Liu Man Hoo, a bankrupt v Liu Man Hoo, HCB 11719 of 2002, 14 September 2007 (unreported), which decision provides useful guidance (the relevant part of which will be discussed below) on how a trustee in bankruptcy should approach an objection to automatic discharge. That case involves not just the same trustee but also contains similar unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conducts as the present case. I consider that I should also have regard to the principles discussed in Re Liu Man Hoo.

In not less than 3 months before the date of Mr. Wong’s automatic discharge from bankruptcy, the Trustee on 3 June 2006 sent the section 30A(5)(a) notices to the proving creditors and informed them that he intended to object to the discharge on the ground of pre-bankruptcy unsatisfactory conduct under section 30A(4)(d).

No objection was raised by any proving creditors to Mr. Wong’s automatic discharge. The Trustee, as had indicated in his notices to the proving creditors, issued the Application, relying on the pre-bankruptcy unsatisfactory conduct ground under section 30A(4)(d).

At the hearing, Miss Ng has largely relied on the recent decision of Deputy High Court Judge To in Fred Lee and Chow Wai Lan, Christine (trustee of the property of Tong Yuk Kin) v Tong Yuk Kin, HCB No. 22870 of 2002, 20 June 2007 (unreported), a decision based on pre-bankruptcy conducts of excessive borrowing as well as misrepresentation as a ground of objection to discharge by the same trustee. In this case, the learned Judge referred to an earlier decision by Kwan J in Fred Lee and Chow Wai Lan, Christine (trustee of the property of Leung Chi Yeung) v Leung Chin Yeung, HCB No. 8779 of 2002 (and two other cases), 9 January 2006 (unreported) and expounded in detail the meaning of unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conduct under A30A(4)(d) in the context of the legislative objectives of section 30A.

Miss Ng also alluded to an earlier decision of Re Hui Hing Kwok [1993] 3 HKC 683, a decision expounding on the legislative objective behind section 30A, which lies in rehabilitation in allowing a bankrupt to resume a normal life in society.

To conclude, given the lack of detailed and timely investigations by the Trustee and the unchallenged evidence of Mr. Wong, I am unable to accept that the Trustee has satisfied me that the excessive borrowing and loss of money in speculation being unsatisfactory conduct. I however find that the conducts of gambling and misrepresentation have been - when viewed objectively - unsatisfactory.

Having concluded that some aspects Mr. Wong’s conducts have not been satisfactory, I should carefully consider whether I ought to exercise my discretion to suspend Mr. Wong from discharge of bankruptcy, and should I so find, to decide the appropriate period of suspension.

In considering how my discretion should be exercised, I shall bear in mind the principles elucidated in the cases referred to above, in particularly the very powerful observations of Lam J in Re Liu Man Hoo (op. cit.) at paragraph 66 that the court should take an overall view of the matter in the exercise of discretion and that suspension of automatic discharge should only be applied to conducts of exceptional gravity (See paras. 65 to 68 in Re Liu Man Hoo).

Mr. Wong’s said pre-bankruptcy unsatisfactory conducts should be balanced against the post-bankruptcy conducts as well as other factors such as the manner the Trustee conducts the investigations and all the circumstances of the case. The unsatisfactory conducts that I have found proved, in my view, are not grave. Further, no objections were raised by any proving creditors against Mr. Wong’s discharge from bankruptcy. Mr. Wong has cooperated with the Trustee in the administration of the estate. Further, from the amounts of contributions he had made to the bankruptcy estate, I am satisfied that Mr. Wong had done his best to contribute to the bankrupt estate without abusing the bankruptcy regime as a debt-clearing house. Last but not the least, by virtue of the interim orders, Mr. Wong prior to the disposal of this case, had effectively been prevented from discharge for about 12 months, which must have caused him much distress.

After having considered all the evidence and balanced the interests of Mr. Wong, that of the commercial world as well as the moral values behind section 30A, I consider that it is not fair to exercise my discretion to suspend any period of automatic discharge.

Upon dismissal of the Application, I also lifted the suspension imposed by the two interim orders granted by Masters and ordered that it should take retrospective effect, adopting the reasoning (with which I agree) in Official Receiver v Chan Kwok Keung, HCB 20772 of 2002, Master Au Yeung (as she then was) 5 July 2007 (unreported).

20 September 2007

FRED LEE and CHOW WAI LAN, CHRISTINE, trustee of the property of LAI WAI HUNG, a bankrupt v. LAI WAI HUNG HCB 14977/2002

S’s words:-

Subsequent to the case of FRED LEE, trustee of the property of LIU MAN HOO, a bankrupt v. LIU MAN HOO HCB 11719/2002, the same Trustee lost another case. However, the most important impact is that, it was ordered by the Court that the Trustee has to bear the costs of the application personally. Will that similar costs order come again in the future?

It is the right time for all trustee to review at what circumstances an application should/should not be made.

Certainly, I have got the thought of how to make better evidence on behalf of the trustees to support such kind of applications.

--- quote from judgment ---

Coram : Before Master Lung in Court

Date of Decision : 12 September 2007

According to the affirmation of the trustee, no creditor has complained to the trustee to initiate this application. This is purely the decision of the trustee himself.

The trustee originally relied on two grounds in support of his application under section 30A(4)(d) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance for his application, namely that the bankrupt had made excessive borrowings, knowing that he might not be able to repay and that he had made misrepresentations to JCG and SHK banks for loans. The trustee now abandons his ground of excessive borrowing in light of the judgment of Kwan J. in Lee Yuk Man’s case [2007] 1 HKC164. He only relies on the remaining ground of misrepresentation alone. The trustee has no other complaints against the bankrupt.

The Trustee has put forth no evidence to rebut the bankrupt’s evidence. I therefore accept the bankrupt’s evidence. I specifically ask Mr. Gopaoco how this court should draw the necessary inference under the evidence before me that the bankrupt had the intention of make misrepresentations to the banks at the material time. Mr. Gopaoco submits he was unable to invite this court to draw such inference.

I take into consideration of the judgment of Kwan J. in Lee Yuk Man’s case, in which the judge found that the approach and mechanism adopted by the trustee were flawed in that the trustee had acted too readily in deciding to take out this application without any investigations into the matter before taking out the application [183H]. In this case, the period of bankruptcy of the bankrupt has been prolonged unnecessary. Since the trustee has failed to discharge his quasi-judicial obligation properly, the trustee is not entitled to recover his costs of and occasioned by this application out of the bankrupt’s estate, following the approach of the learned Judge in Lee Yuk Man’s case [191D-F]. I further order that the bankrupt shall have costs of this application, including all costs reserved in the meantime, such costs are to be taxed, if not agreed. The question of whether such costs should be paid by the Trustee personally or out of the estate has been discussed before me by those the representing the respective parties. I consider that the costs of this application should not be borne by the creditors, as according to the Trustee, they did not initiate this application. I find that the Trustee has failed to discharge his duties of making reasonable investigations into the facts of this case before taking out this application. As such, I consider that the Trustee has to bear the costs of this application personally.

16 September 2007

FRED LEE, trustee of the property of LIU MAN HOO, a bankrupt v. LIU MAN HOO HCB 11719/2002 (3)

S’s words:-
The Judge also in this case talked about his view when an application for the objection should be made.
In no doubt, his view was also supported by his view that the discharge of bankruptcy is in his view a rehabilitation rather than any further punishment to a bankrupt.
The application definitely would affect the bankrupt from discharge immediately. Before this judgment being made, as soon as an application was filed, it would be expected that the application would be adjourned for arguments and also for the parties to file their respective affirmations. And at the time for the call-over hearing, an interim order would be granted. That caused a de facto suspension of the automatic discharge.

That could be used as an abuse by the trustee.

That would be unfair to a bankrupt for applications without merit but could only be dismissed after the final determination of the summons.

Without the necessity to consider the post-bankruptcy conduct, it is right for the Judge to comment that it would not be necessary for the trustee to make the application only at the time near the end of the 4 years’ period.

Therefore, it is right for the Judge to suggest that the trustee should conduct interview to investigate the conduct of the bankrupt’s pre-bankruptcy conduct. With such interview and investigation, the trustee would have the preliminary view as to whether to apply for any suspension of the automatic discharge. The trustee would not be required to wait and even with applications before the Court, it is possible for the Court to decide whether any suspension orders are required to be made before or shortly after the 4 years’ period.

However, at the time of the call-over hearing, Master may then be required to form a preliminary view immediately through the evidence before him/her but yet before a full hearing.

Would the judgment be a guideline for the future application of objection on the part of the trustee?

--- quote from judgment ---

Before : Hon Lam J in Court
Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 14 September 2007

The interim orders and the timing of the application

Before I leave this case, I wish to comment on the practice regarding the grant of interim orders and the timing of the application by the Trustee.

It is important that a trustee and the court should appreciate that it is particularly devastating for a bankrupt to learn for the first time during the last few months of the usual 4 years period that there would be an application to suspend the automatic discharge based on pre-bankruptcy conducts notwithstanding that his post-bankruptcy conducts were more than satisfactory.

Because of the timing of the application and adjournment of the matter pending the outcome of the test case heard by Kwan J, this application was not heard until the end of August 2007. Though I dismissed the application immediately after the hearing, there has already been a de facto suspension of the automatic discharge for more than 10 months.

In Li Tat Kong HCB 741 of 1995, 2 June 2000, Le Pichon J (as she then was) held that the court’s jurisdiction to suspend the automatic discharge was engaged upon the issuance of the summons by the trustee and interim order suspending the automatic discharge pending the final determination of the summons can be made.

It is inherently unfair to a bankrupt if the automatic discharge is suspended due to a late unmeritorious application by a trustee. It is also an abuse of process if a trustee does not conduct any proper investigation during the four years period and leaves it to the last minute to seek to inquire into the affairs of a bankrupt and ask for suspension based on ground (b) under Section 30A(4). Thus in Frost v Sheahan (2005) 3 ABC (NS) 288 at p.301-2, Lander J said,

“ …in some cases, the failure to identify those assets and income may be the fault of the trustee. In those circumstances, it may not be appropriate to continue the administration of the estate if the trustee has not discharged his or her obligations in a diligent manner …”

As explained above, a trustee should have conducted a proper investigation before he can properly decide whether to make an objection. This should include interviewing the bankrupt and ascertaining from him whatever explanations he might have as regards the possible allegations that might be raised against him. It follows that the court is entitled to expect that an application to object would be supported by reasonably comprehensive evidence filed by the trustee. At the call-over hearing, I think the court should form a provisional view on the merit of the application. If the court were of the view that there is a lack of real prospect of achieving any suspension, it should seriously considering dismissing the application if an interim order would have the effect of granting a de facto suspension, particularly if there is no good explanation for the late application.

The Trustee contended that it was reasonable for him to wait until the last moment before he filed an application because he had to take into account of post-bankruptcy conducts. I accept that there could be cases where the reliance on post-bankruptcy conducts entails a late decision to be made regarding the raising of objections. But I do not think this applies to the majority of the cases. Take the facts of the present case as an example, the Trustee should have investigated upon the pre-bankruptcy conducts soon after the filing of the proof of debts. As regards the evidence regarding the misconceived ground (a), it was based on the stable employment of Liu. Bearing in mind the extent of co-operation of Liu since his bankruptcy, there was no indication that the Trustee would need to rely on post-bankruptcy unsatisfactory conducts. I do not see any reason why the Trustee could not take out an application at the end of the third year. If necessary, the Trustee can file supplemental evidence setting out additional grounds if there were developments subsequent to the filing of the original application that are material.

For most cases, by the end of the third year, with reasonable diligence and proper skill and competence, the trustee should have a good idea whether the bankrupt had been co-operative in the post-bankruptcy stage and whether there are pre-bankruptcy unsatisfactory conducts. The trustee should also be able to assess by then whether a discharge of the bankrupt at the end of the usual four years period would prejudice the administration of the estate. I do not think it is too onerous to expect a trustee to make a decision on whether to raise an objection shortly thereafter in a usual case. After all, in the timescale of a four years relevant period, it must be reasonable to expect the trustee to complete most of his investigation into the affairs of a co-operative bankrupt by that stage.

FRED LEE, trustee of the property of LIU MAN HOO, a bankrupt v. LIU MAN HOO HCB 11719/2002 (2)

S’s words:
Apart from the interpretation of Section 30A(4)(a),the Judge further commented that the Trustee should carry out the necessary investigation to inform himself of all relevant facts before he could make a responsible and proper decision on whether to raise his objection based on Section 30A(4)(d) (the 2nd grounds of objection of the Trustee). With no doubt, the Trustee in this case did not even conduct any interview with the bankrupt for his pre-bankruptcy conducts.

That 2nd grounds of objection goes to the unsatisfactory conducts of a bankrupt. The Judge finally decided that the bankrupt’s pre-bankruptcy conducts were unsatisfactory. However, it is quite difficult to understand why the Judge has to take the role to investigate the same but not for the Trustee to hold investigations to ensure the same beforehand.

Further, even though the bankrupt was ruled with pre-bankruptcy conducts, the Judge refused to exercise its discretion. The Judge ruled that the pre-bankruptcy conducts should be so serious. Bearing in mind that there was no interview with the bankrupt in relation to his pre-bankruptcy conducts, it is expected that it would be too difficult to conclude that “the unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conducts were so serious that it would be difficult for a bankrupt to escape suspension altogether”

The issue of interim order will be mentioned in another post.

--- quote from judgment ---

Before : Hon Lam J in Court
Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 14 September 2007

(continue)

Further, a trustee should carry out the necessary investigation to inform himself of all relevant facts before he could make a responsible and proper decision on whether it is appropriate to object in the circumstances of the case in question. I find it astonishing that in the present case, the Trustee had not even conducted any interview with Liu regarding his pre-bankruptcy conducts before he decided to raise an objection based on Section 30A(4)(d).

...

Unsatisfactory conducts
In Lee Fred v Leung Chin Yeung [2007] 1 HKC 164, all the counsel agreed that it connotes a broad and low jurisdictional threshold (see Para.44).

In Para.45, Kwan J made the following observation regarding excessive borrowing,

“ In a case involving excessive credit in which loans were obtained when the debtor should have known he would not be able to repay, where the bankrupt has been co-operative with the trustee and made voluntary contributions to the estate, and provided there is no other misconduct, I am inclined to think that the pre-bankruptcy conduct is not such as to warrant suspension of the running of the relevant period.”

I agree with Deputy Judge A To that in that paragraph, Kwan J was dealing with how the discretion should be exercised as opposed to whether excessive borrowing can constitute unsatisfactory conduct under Section 30A(4)(d).

In Fred Lee v Tong Yuk Kin HCB 22870 of 2002, 20 June 2007, Deputy Judge A To made reference to the law under the old Bankruptcy Ordinance and took the view that in general, the matters set out in Section 30(4) under the old ordinance could be regarded as examples of unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conducts (para.14). The protection of the integrity of the automatic discharge system and the prevention of abuse of the bankruptcy regime were identified as the rationale for taking pre-bankruptcy conducts into account (paras.15 and 16). The acid test formulated by the learned judge is as follows (para.17),

“ Ultimately, the question of whether the conduct is unsatisfactory is whether the conduct is one which the society is prepared to condone without expressing disapproval. This question is to be answered by the reasonable man’s test. This hypothetical reasonable man has to bear in mind the overriding purpose of rehabilitation. He has to take into account whether the debt is a business debt or consumer credit and consider the reasons for which the debt was incurred, the amount of the debt as compared with the bankrupt’s means and station in life, the blameworthiness of the bankrupt and all the circumstances in which the debt arose. In addition, the reasonable man has to take into account human nature, its weakness, its readiness to indulge in extravagant spending and its readiness to engage in speculation and assumption of risk.”

This test was adopted and applied by Master Kwang in Fred Lee v Kwan Kwong Ning HCB 17846 of 2002, 20 August 2007.

In the present case, the Trustee apparently did not conduct any meaningful investigation as regards how the debts of Liu came to be incurred. According to Mr Chan, the Trustee simply extracted the information from the documents filed for proof of debts and the statement of affairs to come to the view that objection should be made. In Lee Fred v Leung Chin Yeung [2007] 1 HKC 164 Kwan J referred to the practice of this trustee at para.35 and explained at para.38 why this practice is flawed. At para.38, Her Ladyship alluded to the fact that the Trustee has filed 150 objections out of 360 cases in which he was appointed during June 2002 to January 2003. I have not been told whether the present case is one of those 150 objections. But the Trustee was appointed within that period and the present objection was filed in September 2006. On 5 October 2006, the present application was adjourned pending the decision of Kwan J. in the three test cases. It was restored on 6 March 2007 after the judgment of Kwan J.

Having regard to the circumstances as a whole, though I do not think Liu intended to cause financial loss to his creditors, I am of the view that Liu’s pre-bankruptcy conducts were unsatisfactory.

Exercise of discretion
In my judgment, the court must take an overall view of the matter in the exercise of discretion. Whilst there are cases where the unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conducts were so serious that it would be difficult for a bankrupt to escape suspension altogether (see Para.17.42 of the Law Reform Commission Report), I am of the view that this case does not fall within such category.

In this connection, I respectfully concur with Lander J’s observations in the Federal Court of Australia in Frost v Sheahan (2005) 3 ABC (NS) 288 at p.294-5,

“ The purpose of the objection procedure is to provide the trustee with a power by which he can induce the bankrupt to act in accordance with the bankrupt’s obligations.
The trustee should not use the power for the purpose of punishing the bankrupt for acts taken by the bankrupt which cannot be rectified. Rather, the power should be used for the purpose of persuading the bankrupt to discharge the bankrupt’s duties under the Act.
It is a power, however, which must be used sparingly and for the purpose of protecting the interests of creditors and in generally advancing the administration of the estate of the bankrupt.
In a sense, it is a power of last resort when no other form of persuasion will assist to remind the bankrupt of the bankrupt’s obligations.”

FRED LEE, trustee of the property of LIU MAN HOO, a bankrupt v. LIU MAN HOO HCB 11719/2002 (1)

S’s words:-
I believe I have in some places made a comment as to whether a trustee should lodge his/her objections for an automatic discharge. The following is another case authority that the Judge did have commented seriously whether the trustee should make an objection.
However, there are some other issues being discussed in this case. Thus, I would try my best to use separate posts to discuss the same.

There was no dispute that the post-bankruptcy conducts of the bankrupt were satisfactory. Further, in fact, he repaid a lot during the four years.

In my personal view, the first grounds of objection by the Trustee was terrible:-

“That Liu is likely within 5 years of commencement of the bankruptcy to be able to make a significant contribution to his estate [Section 30A(4)(a)].”

If whenever a trustee could make good contribution to his estate in the 5th year (and in the 1st to 4th years as well), the Trustee could simply rely on such a ground to submit an objection with the intent to say that the bankrupt could repay more in the 5th year, it would be too discouraging for the bankrupt to try his best to make any repayment.

Fortunately, the Judge did have analysed so well to determine the true intention of the legislation, i.e., when one is repaying for the past 4 years, his discharge should not be suspended due to the fact that it is expected he can in the 5 year be able to make further signification contribution to his estate.

The Judge also commented if a trustee has adopted a practice of raising an objection under Section 30A(4)(a), such practice should be rectified.

--- quote from judgment ---

Before : Hon Lam J in Court
Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 14 September 2007

A bankruptcy order was made against Mr Liu Man Hoo [“Liu”] on 10 October 2002. Since then, he had made reasonable efforts in making regular contributions to his estate for the purpose of repaying his creditors. The total amount of provable debts is $3,654,698. In the four years since the making of the bankruptcy order, Liu had contributed $1,442,011.05 to his estate. Several dividends were declared in favour of the creditors. Liu had been co-operative with the Trustee since his bankruptcy and full and frank disclosure has been given in respect of his affairs. The Trustee accepted that his post-bankruptcy conducts were satisfactory.

In the present case, the Trustee took out an application under Section 30A(3) on 11 September 2006. The grounds of objection relied on by the trustee were,

(a) That Liu is likely within 5 years of commencement of the bankruptcy to be able to make a significant contribution to his estate [Section 30A(4)(a)];
(b) That the conduct of Liu, in respect of the period before the commencement of the bankruptcy, has been unsatisfactory [Section 30A(4)(d)].

The grounds of objection have to be established to give the court a jurisdiction to order suspension. But after a ground is established, the court still has to exercise its discretion in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case. This is clearly spelt out in Re Hui Hing Kwok [1999] 3 HKC 683; see also Fred Lee v Tong Yuk Kin HCB 22870 of 2002, 20 June 2007 Para.18.

The discretion should be exercised in line with the underlying spirit of our bankruptcy law. In Re Hui Hing Kwok [1999] 3 HKC 683, Le Pichon J (as she then was) referred to the purpose of the automatic discharge provision alluded to in para.17.16 of the Law Reform Commission’s Report on Bankruptcy and succinctly summed up the proper approach as follows,

“ Rehabilitation in the sense of enabling the bankrupt to resume a normal life in society is a key, if not the key, consideration. It should only be delayed by a bankrupt’s own failings.”

In Lee Fred v Leung Chin Yeung [2007] 1 HKC 164, Kwan J reiterated that an application to object to discharge is a serious matter and it should not be embarked upon lightly. At para.37, Her Ladyship cited a very helpful dicta of Smithers J in the Federal Court of Australia in Re Zion and it is worth highlighting the following,

“ In my view it is the policy of the law that bankruptcy should in most cases come to an end at three years … Public interest will require that a discharge be delayed or made conditional if the conduct revealed or the character of the bankrupt indicates that the return of the bankrupt to the commercial world in full freedom might involve the unacceptable risk to persons likely to be engaged in commercial relations with him in the future.”

Hence Kwan J also held that a trustee should exercise his judgment before deciding whether to object. At para.38(1), Kwan J pointed out that it is not appropriate to object merely because there is a ground which comes within one of the provisions in Section 30A(4). I respectfully agree. Insofar as a trustee has adopted a practice of raising an objection as of course when a ground can be framed under that subsection, such practice should be rectified.

I regret that based on what I was told at the hearing, the Trustee seems to have taken the stance that he was only concerned with presenting a case that falls within Section 30A(4) and it is left to the court to decide whether the discretion should be exercised against the bankrupt. That is clearly not the right approach. I hope it is an oversight on the part of the Trustee since he should have been fully aware of Kwan J’s observations. It is important for a trustee to appreciate that he is performing a public duty (Kwan J described it as ‘quasi-judicial’ obligation) and an application for suspension under Section 30A(3) will necessarily entail costs to be incurred. Apart from the grounds under Section 30A(4), a trustee should consider all other relevant circumstances in the case to see whether there is at least an arguable case that the court should exercise its discretion against the bankrupt.

Further, a trustee should carry out the necessary investigation to inform himself of all relevant facts before he could make a responsible and proper decision on whether it is appropriate to object in the circumstances of the case in question. I find it astonishing that in the present case, the Trustee had not even conducted any interview with Liu regarding his pre-bankruptcy conducts before he decided to raise an objection based on Section 30A(4)(d).

In Fred Lee v Tong Yuk Kin HCB 22870 of 2002, 20 June 2007, Deputy Judge A To expressed his agreement with the approach of Kwan J. His Lordship however added that the need to preserve commercial morality is also another important consideration underlying the bankruptcy regime. At para.20, the following observation was made,

“ I think conduct involving fraud or misrepresentation in applying for credit which contributed to bankruptcy would invariably result in an abuse of the bankruptcy regime. Save in exceptional cases, the court’s discretion should be exercised against bankrupts whose bankruptcy was related or contributed to by such conduct.”

As compared with Para.20, I think the approach set out in Para.21 of the judgment of Deputy Judge To is a more balanced one. His Lordship said,

“ It should take into consideration all the circumstances leading to the bankruptcy and not just the conduct complained of. It should consider the seriousness of the conduct, the bankrupt’s conduct after the commencement of bankruptcy, the degree of co-operation he has shown with the trustee during the relevant period and the effort he has contributed to repaying his debt. In an appropriate case, the court should consider the risk to the commercial community should the bankrupt be allowed to resume full commercial activity. The discretion to suspend the running of the relevant period should not be lightly exercised. But in its balancing exercise, the court should not allow the bankruptcy regime to be abused.”

At para.22 of his judgment, Deputy Judge A To made the important point that the purpose of suspension is rehabilitative and it should not to be used as a means of extracting more contribution from the bankrupt for distribution to his creditors. That must be correct insofar as pre-bankruptcy misconducts are concerned. However, regarding cases falling under Section 30A(4)(b),(c),(d) (in respect of post-bankruptcy misconducts), (e) and (h), the purpose of suspension may well be the facilitation of the proper administration of the estate.

Ability to make a significant contribution
Section 30A(4)(a) provides the following as a ground on which an objection can be made,

“ …that the bankrupt is likely within 5 years of the commencement of the bankruptcy to be able to made a significant contribution to his estate”.

In Re Maher (1985) 61 ALR 592, Woodward J had this to say regarding a trustee’s role in the materials placed before the court,

“ Clearly the trustee should not put forward irrelevant information, or intrude on the court’s functions, nor should he take a partisan approach to the application by only putting forward material unfavourable to the applicant and supporting the trustee’s opposition. However, the trustee is under a duty to ensure that the court has before it all material that will assist it in considering an application for discharge …”

Whilst it is right and proper that a trustee should use reasonable skill and care in procuring a proper contribution from a bankrupt to the estate during the usual four years period, I do not think it is the purpose of the objection mechanism under Section 30A to empower a trustee to extract more contributions by asking the court to suspend the automatic discharge on account of a likelihood of significant contribution in the succeeding years notwithstanding that contribution have already been made by a bankrupt to the best of his ability during the first four years. That would be incongruous with the professed objective of rehabilitation.

I believe Section 30A(4)(a) is there to catch those bankrupts who have the ability to make a significant contribution but who choose not to utilize such ability and fail to make a proper contribution during the usual four years period. Such bankrupts are at fault and those cases would warrant a consideration of suspension of the automatic discharge. This was what happened in McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 119 ALR 253 where the Australian equivalent of our Section 30A(4)(a) was applied.

The key to the correct construction of Section 30A(4)(a) lies in its reference to the likelihood of the ability of the bankrupt to make a significant contribution within 5 years. If the purpose of the sub-section were to extend the bankruptcy period to facilitate a maximum recovery for the creditors by extracting more contributions in the fifth to eighth years, it needs not refer to the first four years. It would be enough for the legislation to provide under this ground,

“ That the bankrupt is likely to be able to make a significant contribution to his estate in the 4 years after the expiration of the relevant period provided for under sub-section (2) or any part thereof.”

I am of the view that it is a clear case calling for a purposive interpretation of Section 30A(4)(a). There are cogent reasons leading me to the conclusion that the list of objections under Section 30A(4) refers to cases where the bankrupt has been at fault. I do not believe Section 30A (4)(a) is there to enable a trustee to extract further contribution from a bankrupt for the benefit of the creditors when he has not been at fault during the usual 4 years period.

In the alternative, if I were somehow wrong on my construction of Section 30A(4)(a), I will hold that the court should place great weight on the due diligence on the part of a bankrupt in making contribution during the first 4 years in the exercise its discretion under Section 30A(3). If the only ground relied upon to object is that such a bankrupt could make further significant contribution in the years to come, in line with the guidance as regards the underlying policy of Section 30A(3), it is unlikely that the court would order any suspension at all.